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Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of
Shareholder Oversight
EMILY WINSTON†
BlackRock’s recent public letters to the CEOs of the companies in which it invests have drawn
substantial attention from stock market actors and observers for their conspicuous call on corporate
CEOs to focus on sustainability and social impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders. This Article
explores the market changes that propelled BlackRock into a position to make such a call, and whether
institutional shareholders can be effective monitors of these broad social goals. It argues that while
corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders can improve firm value, shareholder oversight of
these stakeholder relationships will not succeed in having this effect.
In the past several decades, U.S. institutional shareholders have come to exert significant influence over
corporate managers. In the wake of this shift, concerns have arisen about how shareholders are using
their power to influence corporate managers. Described herein as “managerial fixation” on
shareholders, these discussions raise concerns about negative stakeholder impacts and a loss of firm
value.
The team production theory of corporate law explains why, when shareholders are disproportionately
influential, other stakeholders’ interests will be neglected to the detriment of corporate value. This
theory leaves open the question of why shareholders cannot simply use their influence to remedy the
problem. This Article fills that gap.
Even when shareholders are financially incentivized to use their power to promote the interests of other
stakeholders, they will lack the information about stakeholder relationships necessary to do so
effectively. This asymmetry of information means that shareholders cannot incorporate stakeholder
information into their assessment of firm value, so managing to shareholder expectations will not
maximize the value created by stakeholder relationships. Thus, a solution to managerial fixation must
entail reducing shareholders’ proportional influence over managerial decision-making vis-à-vis the
corporation’s other stakeholders. This Article concludes by offering two proposals for governance
mechanisms that would encourage this reallocation of managerial attention.

† Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to Jennifer Arlen, Dan
Barnhizer, Anat Beck, David Blankfein-Tabachnick, Margaret Blair, Curtis Bridgeman, Patrick Corrigan, Sarah
Dadush, Lisa Fairfax, Cathy Hwang, Ben Means, Ed Rock, Veronica Root, Jeff Schwartz, Helen Scott, Greg
Shill, and Katy Yang for very helpful comments and conversations. I also owe substantial gratitude to the
participants in the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting and the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
BlackRock is the world’s largest asset manager with $6.84 trillion of assets
under management as of June 30, 2019.1 That is, it is the largest among a global
class of institutional investors that pool the smaller investments of individuals
and other institutions (such as pension funds) and invest them on behalf of their
clients. Each year, BlackRock’s chief executive, Larry Fink, publishes a “Letter
to CEOs” that is addressed to the CEOs of the corporations in which BlackRock
invests on behalf of its clients. The letter describes BlackRock’s strategies and
priorities for the upcoming year and elucidates what it will be looking for in the
companies in which it invests. Given BlackRock’s prominent position in the
capital markets, this letter is usually eagerly anticipated and extensively
analyzed in the business press. The 2018 letter, entitled “A Sense of Purpose,”
ignited a great deal of commentary due to its conspicuous call on corporate
CEOs to focus on sustainability and impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders.2
To encourage this “sense of purpose,” Fink states in his letter that
BlackRock will devote additional resources to more effectively engaging with
corporate managers on issues of long-term growth and stakeholder
relationships.3 While the letter is artfully phrased to leave open a number of
possible paths forward for BlackRock, the commitment of resources and
discussion of increased engagement with managers implies an expanded role for
BlackRock in holding corporations accountable for their stakeholder impacts.4

1. Introduction to Blackrock, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/sg/en/introduction-to-blackrock
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020).The next two largest asset managers are Vanguard and State Street which, together
with BlackRock, are often referred to as the “big three.” Combined, the “big three” manage over $11 trillion of
assets. Taken together, they represent the largest shareholder in ninety percent of S&P 500 firms. Given their
ubiquity as substantial shareholders, the “big three” are watched closely by corporate managers and other market
observers. Their relatively large shareholdings grant them substantial influence over corporate managers. Jan
Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate
Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–300 (2017).
2. Larry Fink,
Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 20, 2020)
[hereinafter Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs] (“To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.”). Fink
wrote an updated letter in 2019, which extends this theme. The 2019 letter did not garner as dramatic a reaction
as the 2018 letter, likely because it is not as novel and merely builds on the themes from the 2018 letter. See
Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). His 2020 letter focusses on climate change
and corporate environmental impacts. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental
Reshaping of Finance, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited
Mar. 20, 2020).
3. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2 (“We . . . intend to double the size of the investment
stewardship team over the next three years [to] . . . foster even more effective engagement with your company
by building a framework for deeper, more frequent, and more productive conversations.”).
4. While other plausible interpretations exist, this Article focuses on the interpretation that Fink expects
corporate CEOs to be accountable, in some manner, to BlackRock for their corporations’ impacts on other
stakeholder groups.
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One of the most-cited reactions to Fink’s letter was from billionaire
investor Sam Zell, who lamented during a television interview, “I didn’t know
Larry Fink had been made God.”5 While this reaction was clearly an expression
of frustration with Fink’s position, it also draws attention to the extent to which
Fink’s letter was a departure from existing norms and potentially an expansion
of BlackRock’s influence. This raises two questions. First, what has changed in
the U.S. public equity markets that caused a prominent shareholder like
BlackRock to call for socially responsible management by CEOs?6 Second, will
the approach that the letter represents—shareholder oversight of corporate social
impacts—succeed? This Article explores these two questions and concludes that
(1) Fink’s letter was precipitated by a decades-long trend of shareholder
empowerment which gave rise to concerns about corporate governance, and (2)
regardless of their incentives, influence and investment horizon, shareholders
cannot effectively serve as monitors of social impact.
Corporations are a government creation that originated from a desire to
create a structure that would enable business enterprises to commit large
amounts of capital to long-term pursuits in furtherance of the public interest. The
motivation behind establishing the corporate form was to create an entity that
simultaneously furthers the interests of both investors and other constituencies.
Corporations provide employment, goods and services, and investment returns,
all of which can create a positive social impact, though they can also contribute
to negative externalities such as environmental degradation. Thus, the interests
of the various parties affected by corporate actions—its stakeholders—can be
symbiotic. Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a substantial
extent to which positive impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders can increase
returns to shareholders. Fink’s letter calls on corporate CEOs to capitalize on
this coincidence of interests.
For close to a century now, discussions about corporate governance and
regulation have focused on concerns about shareholder-manager agency costs.7
The central concern raised by these discussions is that dispersed and passive
shareholders will be unable to monitor corporate managers, to the detriment of
firm value. In recent years, however, these agency costs have diminished
5. Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Billionaire Sam Zell: BlackRock’s Larry Fink is “Extraordinarily
Hypocritical” to Push Social Responsibility, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/16/sam-zell-blackrockceo-fink-is-hypocritical-to-push-social-responsibility.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 10:33 AM).
6. This Article does not assume that Larry Fink is entirely sincere about the benevolent position he
espouses in his letter. The letter, however, was in response to widespread calls on institutional shareholders to
use their power to redirect corporate attention to other stakeholders. See infra Subpart II.B. Other prominent
institutional shareholders have also heeded this call and published similar communications. See Business
Roundtable Redefines the Purposes of a Corporation to Promote “An Economy that Serves All Americans”,
BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. The analysis herein is not an
evaluation of the likelihood that Larry Fink, specifically, will succeed in his purported efforts to refocus
corporate CEOs on social issues. Rather, it is an evaluation of whether this approach—institutional shareholders
using their ample influence monitor other stakeholder impacts—will be successful.
7. See infra Subpart II.A.1
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substantially. Developments in financial theory led to extraordinary growth in
institutional investments, which have dramatically reduced the dispersion of
shareholdings.8 Regulatory efforts aimed at increasing shareholder influence,
together with the private proxy advisory industry, have reduced investor
passivity and collective action problems. With this newfound influence,
institutional shareholders have been able to press corporations to amend their
charters and bylaws to increase their power further. Thus, what was once
considered the “master” economic problem facing corporations has substantially
diminished.9
In the wake of these changes, however, new concerns have arisen about the
apparent downsides of highly empowered shareholders. Often discussed under
the heading of concerns about “short-termism,”10 these discussions point out that
in corporate managers’ zealous efforts to please shareholders, other corporate
stakeholders’ interests appear to have been devalued. This Article argues that
this apparent stakeholder neglect derives not from a subgroup of shareholders
with particularly short investment horizons, but more broadly from the
disproportionate influence of public shareholders as a class. Thus, even very
long-term shareholders such as BlackRock (or its competitors) can be
contributors, rather than solutions, to this problem. This Article therefore uses
the term “managerial fixation” to describe this perceived lack of attention to nonshareholder stakeholders in order to emphasize the role of managerial attention
to shareholders and de-emphasize distinctions in investment horizons.
Somewhat ironically, this lack of attention to non-shareholder stakeholders is
widely believed to come at the expense of long term firm value and thereby
returns to shareholders themselves.11 So, substantially reducing the problem of
shareholder-manager agency costs does not appear to have worked to
unequivocally maximize firm value.
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory of corporate law
provides a useful framework for understanding why concerns about managerial
fixation have arisen in the wake of shareholder empowerment. The team
production theory argues that shareholder power is properly limited because
shareholders are only one of many constituencies whose firm-specific
investments are necessary for corporate production.12 The inputs of other
stakeholders such as creditors, customers, employees, suppliers and the

8. Institutional investors currently hold eighty percent of U.S. equity securities. Charles McGrath, 80%
of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017, 1:00 AM),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-byinstitutions#.
9. Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1910–
11 (2013).
10. Refers to the idea that corporate managers may be making decisions to please shortsighted shareholders
at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth.
11. See infra Subpart I.B.
12. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 250 (1999).
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environment are also necessary for a corporation to produce goods and services,
and a successful corporation must take steps to attract optimal quantities of those
inputs as well. Under this theory, if shareholders become disproportionately
influential, managerial attention will be drawn away from the other stakeholders
to the detriment of firm value.
The team production theory largely predicts recent concerns about
managerial fixation. It predicts that disproportionately powerful shareholders
would divert managerial attention from other stakeholders. It also predicts that
this managerial fixation will come at the expense of firm value, giving
shareholders ample incentives to solve the managerial fixation problem. Team
production leaves open the question of whether shareholders can simply use
their substantial influence to monitor and optimize corporations’ stakeholder
impacts. Observers concerned with short-termism have called on influential
shareholders to do precisely that, and Fink’s letter is a response to that call. This
Article seeks to fill this gap and argues that such efforts will inevitably be
ineffective because shareholders lack access to the information necessary to
effectively evaluate the interests of other stakeholder groups.
Public shareholders are not perfectly informed. Corporate managers have
access to information about their firms to which public shareholders do not have
access. Prominent in this category of private information is information about
the corporation’s relationships with its non-shareholder stakeholders.
Corporations’ relationships with their stakeholders are governed by agreements
that are, to varying degrees, incomplete. At-will employees and customers, in
particular, have very incomplete agreements with corporations, meaning most,
if not all, terms of agreement are not explicitly specified. Even the more specific
contracts, such as those with suppliers and creditors, will still have unspecified
terms and will need to be negotiated repeatedly over the course of the
corporation’s life. Stakeholder agreements are therefore the subject of ongoing
negotiations between firm managers and the relevant stakeholders. Managing
these relationships is the role of a corporate manager, and it exposes managers
to vital information about those stakeholder relationships to which shareholders
are not privy. This information is not reducible to metrics that can be effectively
transferred to shareholders, and public shareholders, by their nature, are not
positioned, nor do they have the expertise, to be intimately involved in the
management of other stakeholder relationships. Thus, information asymmetries
will prevent shareholders from being effective monitors of other stakeholder
interests.
The implication of this analysis is that shareholders’ proportional share of
managerial attention should be reduced vis-à-vis that of other stakeholders. The
usual objection to any reduction in shareholder power is that eliminating
shareholder oversight essentially frees managers to pursue their own interests at
the corporation’s expense. While some managerial rent-seeking may well result
from reducing shareholder influence, the magnitude of that cost is far from clear.
And, as this Article demonstrates, there can be costs associated with
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disproportionately empowered shareholders as well. So, concerns about
managerial agency costs should not overshadow the potential costs of
managerial fixation. Nonetheless, shareholders may be able to direct managerial
attention to other stakeholders while reducing the likelihood or magnitude of
agency costs by pressuring corporations to look internally to adopt stakeholderprotective procedures and mechanisms. They can do this by pressing for
corporate responsibility reporting to the board of directors and stakeholder
metrics in executive compensation formulas.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the
fundamental social and economic functions of corporations, and defines the
boundaries of the analysis herein. Part II describes the principal-agent problem,
how it has diminished in recent decades, and the resulting concerns about
managerial fixation. Part III summarizes the team production theory of the
corporation and its implication that shareholder empowerment has come at the
expense of firm value. It then describes how shareholders are limited in their
ability to use their power to monitor corporate outcomes for other stakeholder
groups. Part IV proposes two ways in which shareholders can use their
substantial influence to encourage managers to direct meaningful attention to
other stakeholder relationships.
I. CORPORATIONS’ SIMULTANEOUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
While Fink’s call for attention to corporate social outcomes may have come
as a surprise to many modern market observers, the ability of corporations to
serve broad social and economic goals has long been a core characteristic of the
corporate form. This Part briefly describes the socially-oriented origin of U.S.
corporations, which sought to capitalize on the corporate form’s unique capacity
to provide benefits for both shareholders and the broader public. It then explores
the complexities of the relationship between a public corporation’s shareholders
(such as BlackRock)13 and its other stakeholders (such as the employees,
customers and communities that Fink mentions in his letter)14 and defines the
parameters of the remainder of the analysis herein.
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF U.S.
CORPORATIONS
Corporations exist as a business entity type in the United States because
state governments have enacted and maintained corporation laws that allow
corporations to be formed in their states.15 The existence of corporations is
13. BlackRock holds shares on behalf of its investor clients. It is the registered owner and thus, votes the
shares it holds for its clients, while its investor clients are the beneficial owners of the shares with a right to the
economic benefits of the shares.” See, e.g., 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT, BLACKROCK 23
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-2019.pdf
(referring to BlackRock’s clients as “the asset owners”).
14. See Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2020).
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therefore the result of government action, and corporations are often the objects
of extensive governmental regulation and attention. Governments created the
corporate form because of its potential to create unique social benefits, and
governments regulate corporations largely in an attempt to control the negative
externalities they create.16
Historically, the first corporate charters in the United States were granted
to organizations that today we would call charitable organizations, such as
hospitals and universities.17 These organizations made direct requests to state
legislatures for corporate charters. Governments were motivated to grant these
charters to ensure these organizations could continue to provide public services
notwithstanding the individual choices or circumstances of the contributors of
capital.18
As the U.S. economy developed and evolved, corporate charters were
increasingly granted to more profit-driven endeavors such as banking and the
construction of turnpikes, which, while not charitable, nevertheless provided
important public services.19 These were endeavors that required substantial
capital inputs, and that provided clear and important public services that would
be substantially inhibited if capital contributors were able to withdraw their
contributions.20 In the nineteenth century United States, as industrialization set
in and business practices expanded their geographic scope, the utility of a
corporate charter proved to have a much broader application. In an attempt to
democratize the corporate form, states began to adopt statutes making corporate
formation publicly available (that is, not requiring a specific appeal to a
legislature for a charter),21 and the number of incorporated organizations
increased dramatically.22 States adopted statutes allowing for the formation of
corporations because they recognized the social utility of amassing capital from
unrelated investors and directing it to business organizations that operated across
geographic boundaries and over indefinite periods of time.
With the advent of the corporation, equity investors were now protected
from personal liability, not required to devote resources to actively managing

16. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 351 (2017).
17. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 1, 11–12 (2004).
18. Without a corporate charter, the business activities of these institutions would have been treated as
partnerships under the law. Partners were entitled to withdraw their share of the partnership’s assets upon
request, and partnerships dissolved upon the death of a partner. These characteristics created uncertainty about
the long or medium-term prospects of the partnership enterprise, which likely deterred investment. Granting a
corporate charter allowed the organization’s assets to be held by a fictional “legal person,” permitting the
organization to continue to provide important public services without interruption. Id.; see also Ralph Nader et
al., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 33 (1976).
19. Blair, supra note 17, at 12–13.
20. As they could in the traditional partnership form. Id. at 20; Nader et al., supra note 18, at 34.
21. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 92
(2018) (noting that when direct appeals to the legislature were required to form a corporation, charters tended to
be granted predominantly to the wealthy and well-connected).
22. Nader et al., supra note 18, at 36–38.
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the enterprise,23 and could sell their shares to an available buyer should they
decide to end their investment. Moreover, equity holders were not permitted to
withdraw their share of corporate assets, and the corporation survived its equity
investors, giving investors greater assurance as to the long-term viability of the
enterprise.24 With these advantages, businesses formed as corporations could
more easily attract capital. Via the corporate form, a much broader swath of
society could benefit from the social and economic contributions of business
activity.
As business professors Michael C. Jensen and William A. Meckling
concluded in their seminal paper on the structure of the firm, “[t]he publicly held
business corporation is an awesome social invention.”25 This is so because it
encourages capital to flow from a broad array of relatively small investors to
enterprises that can provide quality-of-life-enhancing goods and services to a
large population over an extended period of time. The ability to simultaneously
provide benefits to shareholders, consumers and other corporate stakeholders is
therefore a foundational characteristic of the corporate form.26
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER AND OTHER STAKEHOLDER
INTERESTS
Acknowledging that the fundamental goal of corporations is to provide
benefits to a variety of stakeholders raises the question of whether improved
outcomes for non-shareholders contribute to or come at the expense of
shareholder returns. The group of individuals impacted by a large, publicly
traded corporation’s actions—its “stakeholders”—is very broad and extends
well beyond shareholders. As corporations have expanded in size and
geographic scope, this group has only grown. Scholars and observers have
variously identified numerous categories of corporate stakeholders, including
employees, directors, shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers,

23. This is an important characteristic that is discussed further in Subpart III.B.3.
24. Blair, supra note 17, at 4, 7.
25. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976).
26. Substantial debate exists over whether corporations should be managed with an explicit focus on their
social impacts. See Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1790–96 (2018). But even those who argue that corporations should be managed with
no goal other than profits and shareholder returns, do so on the basis that this will result in the best economywide social outcome. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Sept.
13,
1970),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1970/09/13/issue.html (describing the adverse social effects of managers spending corporate resources to
promote “social” causes: “Insofar as his actions in accord with his ‘social responsibility’ reduce returns to
stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the
customers’ money. Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.”);
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1637, 1644 (2013) (“[S]hareholder ability to intervene and engage with companies provides long-term benefits
to companies, shareholders, and the economy.”).
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governmental officials, communities, the environment, and society.27 Because
of the diversity of interests at stake, it is highly possible that conflicts will arise
among stakeholder groups—that is, that the promotion of one stakeholder
group’s interests may come at the expense of the other. Given the longstanding
focus on share price in corporate scholarship and practice (described in more
detail in Part II herein), the question that most often arises is whether promoting
the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders must result in a reduction in returns
to shareholders.28 That is, will focusing on other stakeholder impacts simply redistribute some of the shareholders’ slice of the pie to other groups? Or, might
improving returns to non-shareholder stakeholders result in a larger pie that also
results in a larger slice for shareholders? The approach described in Fink’s letter
is an effort to increase the size of the pie via attention to non-shareholder
stakeholders.
Many scholars have endeavored to empirically test the relationship
between shareholder and other stakeholder interests. While such studies are
quite numerous, they fail to conclusively answer the question.29 To highlight but
a few divergent results, Allen Ferrell et al. compared firms’ indicators of
corporate social responsibility to their indicators of managerial agency problems
and found a positive relationship between socially responsible firm activity and
firm value.30 In contrast, Kenneth Aupperle et al. surveyed firms to ascertain
their social responsibility-orientation and found no relationship between social
responsibility and profitability.31 Situated halfway between these two outcomes,

27. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 253 (identifying “employees, consumers, creditors, and other
corporate ‘stakeholders’”); see also R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 31–32 (1984) (“The list of stakeholders originally included shareholders, employees, customers,
suppliers, lenders and society.”); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, in U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Donald H Chew & Stuart L. Gillan eds.,
2009) (“Stakeholders include all individuals or groups who can substantially affect, or be affected by, the welfare
of the firm—a category that includes not only the financial claimholders, but also employees, customers,
communities and government officials.”); WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND
RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS
OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC, 5–6 n.21 (2013), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf (“Key stakeholders in a business
organization include customers, directors, employees, shareholders, suppliers, the community from which the
business draws its resources, etc.”).
28. The question of tradeoffs among non-shareholder stakeholders is also interesting but receives
substantially less attention due to the historical primacy of shareholder interests. Though, as Part III will describe,
the team production theory speaks to this issue.
29. See Michael L. Barnett, Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to
Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 794, 794 (2007) (“[A]fter more than thirty years of
research, we cannot clearly conclude whether a one-dollar investment in social initiatives returns more or less
than one dollar in benefit to the shareholder.”).
30. Allen Ferrell, et al., Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 585, 585 (2016) (“[W]ell-governed
firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control
wedge, strong minority protection) engage in more CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between
CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.”).
31. Kenneth Aupperle, et al., An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Corporate Social
Responsibility and Profitability, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 446, 446 (1985) (“This study . . . did not find any
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Shawn Berman et al. found that attending to non-shareholder stakeholders for
strategic reasons enhances financial performance, whereas doing so for intrinsic
reasons does not.32 While the balance of evidence seems to weigh in favor of a
positive relationship between attention to non-shareholder stakeholders and firm
value, these studies point in a number of different directions regarding whether,
to what extent, and in what circumstances this relationship exists.33
The difficulty in arriving at a determinative empirical conclusion about the
relationship between shareholder and other stakeholder interests is not surprising
given the diversity of stakeholder groups described above. We should expect
results to vary based on which stakeholder groups are the subject of managerial
attention, in what proportions, in what type of industry and in what type of
business and political environment, among other factors.34 It is quite easy to
imagine ways in which too much concern for non-shareholder stakeholders
could shrink the corporate pie. Excessively high wages or excessively low prices
could cause a corporation to be unprofitable. However, excessively low wages
or high prices could have a similar effect. Thus, a definitive answer to the
question of whether shareholders benefit from managerial attention to other
stakeholders is unattainable. The question is simply too broad.
Nonetheless, it should be uncontroversial that some level of attention to
other stakeholders not only benefits shareholders, but is necessary to create any
return to shareholders at all. A corporation must give some amount of attention
to the needs of its employees in order to recruit and retain a workforce.35

relationship between social responsibility and profitability. Specifically, varying levels of social orientation were
not found to correlate with performance differences.”).
32. Shawn Berman, et al., Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter? The Relationship Between Stakeholder
Management Models and Firm Financial Performance, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 488, 488 (1999) (“The results
provide support for a strategic stakeholder management model but no support for an intrinsic stakeholder
commitment model.”).
33. Empirical studies of this relationship are far too numerous to list here, but several additional examples
include: Xin Deng, et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from
Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87 (2013) (finding that corporate acquirers with a stronger commitment to CSR
performed better post-merger); Caroline Flammer, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction:
The Environmental Awareness of Investors, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 758 (2013) (finding stock price increases
following reporting of responsible environmental behavior by companies); Preston E. Lee & Harry J. Sapienza,
Stakeholder Management and Corporate Performance, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 361 (1990) (finding most indicators
of stakeholder performance are associated with conventional measures of corporate profitability and growth).
But see Ing-Haw Cheng, et al., Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19432, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19432.pdf (finding that spending on
CSR is partly due to agency problems).
34. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 795 (“The unique and dynamic characteristics of firms and their
environments preclude stability in financial returns to CSR across firms and time, so we should not expect to
empirically discern a consistent financial benefit—essentially, a universal rate of return—to a generic
corporation for some given unit of social investment.”).
35. See Peter Georgescu, Just 100 Do Well by Doing Good, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:39AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergeorgescu/2018/01/10/just-100-well-by-doing-good/#125d3fd86335
(“Increasingly, the only way to win is to treat your employees and customers as if they matter as much as your
profits. . . . It’s counter-intuitive to think you will earn more by increasing the largest cost of doing business,
your payroll. But it works.”).
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Likewise, it needs to attend adequately to the preferences of its suppliers in order
to attract supplies, and to the needs of its creditors in order to attract credit.
Similar statements can be made for other corporate stakeholders as well, and
without these stakeholder inputs the corporation cannot produce anything.36
Therefore, there is some minimum level of attention to non-shareholder
stakeholders that is required in order for the corporation to earn any profits that
it can return to shareholders. And, it is safe to assume that the amount of
stakeholder attention that will maximize corporate output and firm value is
somewhere above this bare minimum. So, up to a point, focusing on the effects
of corporate activity on groups other than shareholders can be expected to have
a positive impact on shareholder returns. Larry Fink’s letter appears inspired by
a desire to reach that point, and this Article analyzes whether shareholders like
BlackRock are capable of identifying the profit-maximizing mix of attention to
non-shareholders stakeholders.
C. PARAMETERS OF ANALYSIS
While the potential coincidence of shareholder and other stakeholder
interests is an important phenomenon that should be exploited, it is certainly not
the case that profit-seeking behavior by corporations can cure all social ills.
Acknowledging this limitation, the scope of the analysis in this Article is
circumscribed in two important ways.
First, not all stakeholder interests can be effectively promoted by corporate
action. There will often be instances where responsibility for protecting
stakeholder interests more appropriately and effectively falls to the government.
Stakeholder interests can roughly be divided into three categories, depending on
the extent to which corporate activity can effectively address them.
The first category comprises stakeholder interests that cannot be
adequately protected by corporate management alone. Corporations need to
induce stakeholders to contribute to the firm, whether in the form of employee
time, customer purchases, or any other relevant input. However, this corporate
demand will only work for the benefit of stakeholders where adequate
competition exists for their contributions. Where well-functioning markets do
not exist for stakeholder inputs, stakeholder interests will require government
protection.
Perhaps most prominently, there is no naturally existing market for
environmental inputs. As a public good, regulation is necessary to ensure that
environmental resources are not depleted by corporate production. For other
stakeholder groups, markets may naturally exist, but will require government
intervention to function properly. For example, a well-functioning market for
customers requires effective competition law, and the market for labor may
require employment laws to ensure that employees have adequate bargaining

36. A corporation’s need to attract inputs from an array of stakeholders is the basis of the team production
theory of the corporation, which is discussed in detail in infra Subpart III.A.
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power to create a robust market for their labor.37 Interests in this first category
require government intervention because corporate action alone cannot address
them.
The second category comprises stakeholder interests that could be
addressed by governmental regulation, corporate management, or by some
combination of the two. Examples of second category interests include family
leave or product safety. These are issues for which a society may believe there
is a minimum standard below which no corporation should be permitted to fall.
It is the role of government to set that minimum standard. However, above the
minimum standard, corporate managers can choose the level that will attract the
optimal stakeholder inputs to maximize the value of corporate production. Thus,
most issues in this category will involve both government and management
intervention, and the scope of possible corporate intervention will be a function
of the minimum standards set by the government.
The third category comprises stakeholder interests that can only be
effectively addressed by corporate managers. These interests include product
development, employee development, and creating a culture of integrity and
compliance.38 Product development is a means by which corporations meet their
customers’ needs. Employee development and wellness programs are a means
by which corporations further the interests of their employees in a manner that
is specific to the corporation. And, creating a corporate culture of integrity and
compliance promotes the interests of all stakeholders who are the beneficiaries
of that integrity, including shareholders. These issues have very clear
stakeholder impacts, but are very specific to the context of each individual
corporation. As such, they are not appropriate areas for governmental
intervention, and are instead issues to be addressed internally by corporate
managers. Because this Article discusses corporate impacts on non-shareholder
stakeholders, the discussion herein is limited to second and third category
interests.
An additional boundary of the discussion arises from acknowledging that
the specific quantity and composition of corporate attention to stakeholders that
maximizes returns to shareholders may not be the same package of stakeholder
attention that maximizes the net social benefit of a corporation’s activities.
While maximizing net social benefit is an appropriate goal for corporate activity

37. See, e.g., If Wages are to Rise, Workers Need More Bargaining Power, THE ECONOMIST (May 31,
2018),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/31/if-wages-are-to-rise-workers-needmore-bargaining-power; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1947–48 (1996) (describing how the threat of unionization
disciplines corporate managers). Indeed, even Milton Friedman contemplated an important role for labor unions
in exerting pressure on corporate managers. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)
(arguing that corporate managers have no “social” responsibility to their employees because employees have
labor leaders to represent their interests).
38. While the securities laws may, appropriately, mandate compliance procedures, creating a culture that
fosters compliance is dependent on firm management. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance,
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 949 (2017).
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at a societal level, the analysis in this Article is more limited in scope. Fink’s
letter is a response to calls on shareholders to use their influence to direct
corporate attention to other stakeholders. Such calls are not made with the hope
that institutional investors will do so altruistically, but rather are based on a
belief that doing so will financially benefit most shareholders.39 Thus, in
examining the limitations of the approach represented by Fink’s letter, the
analysis herein is limited to the economic space wherein attention to nonshareholder stakeholders can be expected increase returns to shareholders.
On the basis of the discussion above, the remainder of this Article proceeds
from the premise that some corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders
is necessary to maximize corporate value, and that the Fink letter and the calls
to which it is a response represent an effort to push corporate managers toward
the profit-maximizing level of stakeholder engagement. To that end, it focuses
on the economic area where the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders
coincide.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. EQUITY MARKETS
If attention to a corporation’s non-shareholder stakeholders is, at least
sometimes, expected to be conducive to shareholder returns, then Fink’s letter
seems unsurprising. He is merely asking BlackRock’s investee companies to
turn their attention to issues that will likely have a positive effect on returns to
BlackRock’s clients.40 Nonetheless, it came as a surprise to many observers
because it was a departure from recent past practices. This begs the question:
what has changed? If managerial attention to other stakeholders is necessary to
maximize returns to shareholders, why have shareholders not always focused on
this issue? And, why is anyone surprised they are doing so now? This Part
describes the substantial changes that have occurred in U.S. public equity
markets over the past several decades and the theory underlying many of these
changes. It then describes the concerns about corporate impacts that have arisen
in the wake of these changes and explains the impetus to call on powerful
shareholders like BlackRock to address these concerns.

39. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2.
40. It is quite possible that Fink’s purpose in crafting this letter was something other than a sincere intent
to engage with BlackRock’s investee companies on issues of social responsibility. Several other plausible
explanations exist, including that the letter is either an attempt to avoid future regulation or a marketing ploy.
The sincerity of the letter is not relevant to the argument made here. See id.
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TODAY’S SHAREHOLDERS EXERT SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OVER
CORPORATE MANAGERS
1.

Theoretical Antecedent: Agency Cost Theory

Concerns about shareholders’ limited ability to monitor corporate
managers have dominated discussions about corporate activity for decades, but
many of the changes that have taken place in U.S. public equity markets over
the last several decades have, to an extent, assuaged these concerns.
The origin of this discussion among U.S. legal scholars lies in Professors
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ famous 1934 book, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.41 Berle and Means conceived of shareholders as the
owners of the corporation who were granted only limited rights to control the
managers who they hire as agents to run their corporation. Berle and Means were
concerned that these limited rights left shareholders without adequate control
over managers, who could in turn manage corporations in furtherance of their
own interests and to the detriment of shareholders and the corporate enterprise.42
That is, the “separation of ownership and control” meant that shareholders, as
principals, faced agency costs arising from their inability to adequately control
their manager “agents.” This concept was formalized into an economic theory
by Professors Jensen and Meckling in 1976,43 and has continued to dominate
conversations about corporate control among practitioners and academics.44
Under this theoretical framework, the combined effects of legal constraints
and the dispersion of share ownership in publicly traded corporations result in
agency costs to shareholders. Corporate law in the United States grants
shareholders only limited rights to control directors and officers, while primary

41. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). The earliest identification of this potential problem may have been in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations in 1776, where he pointed out the inadequate incentives facing managers who manage “other people’s
money.” 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 311 (1776)
(“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money
than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance
with which the partners in a private copartner frequently watch over their own.”).
42. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 116 (“[I]t is therefore evident that we are dealing not only with
distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the other— a control which tends
to move further and further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a
management capable of perpetuating its own position.”).
43. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25.
44. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 248 (“Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come
to be dominated by the view that public corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned
by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.”). A
sample of prominent literature studying managerial agency costs includes: Lucian Bebchuk, et al., What Matters
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641
(1999); Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5
J. FIN. RES. 249 (1982).
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responsibility for managing the corporation lies with the board of directors.45
Shareholders have the right to elect directors, vote on major transactions, inspect
corporate books and records and file derivative suits.46 These rights give
shareholders the ability to approve of or intervene after board action, but they
do not give shareholders the right to initiate any major corporate decisions.47 In
theory, shareholders’ power to replace directors should incentivize directors to
take actions that promote shareholders’ interests.48 However, in order for
shareholders to use the limited rights they do hold to police corporate
management, they must coordinate among themselves. Under state corporation
law, a shareholder vote against corporate action requires a majority vote, and
directors are elected by a plurality.49 Agency costs arise when shareholders
cannot or do not organize to use these rights to ensure the firm is managed for
their benefit. When shareholdings are widely dispersed among many
shareholders holding small percentages of equity, collective action problems
make such coordination difficult.50
Concerns about shareholder-manager agency costs derive not only from
concern about shareholders’ own financial interests, but also from a belief that
shareholders are the stakeholder group best positioned to maximize the total
value created by firms.51 This belief arises from characterizing shareholders as
“residual claimants” to the corporation.52 That is, shareholders are the group
entitled to receive “whatever remains after all revenues have been collected and
all debts, expenses and other contractual obligations have been paid.”53 In the
“classical firm” that underlies agency cost theories, it is assumed that the nonshareholder stakeholders who contribute to the firm do so subject to contracts
that specify the portion of firm value that each non-shareholder stakeholder will

45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”).
46. Id. at §§ 211–212, 220, 251(c), 327.
47. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836
(2005) (“A central and well-settled principle of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate decisions must be
initiated by the board. Shareholders may not initiate any such decisions.”).
48. Id. at 837. Shareholders may also signal discontent by selling their shares, though this option’s
availability is decreasing as more and more investors place their investments in index funds and ETFs, which
invest in a particular group or “index” of companies and do not sell their shares unless a company no longer
meets the criteria to be in the group. Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street11568799004.
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216. But see infra Subpart II.A.2 (describing the recent trend of public
corporations adopting majority voting provisions).
50. Professor Mark Roe has argued that the dispersion of shareholders in the U.S. equity markets is itself
a result of U.S. legal rules. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
51. Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 842–43 (“[I]ncreased shareholder power would be desirable only if it would
operate to improve corporate performance and value.”).
52. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 291 (1992).
53. Id.
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receive.54 With all amounts due to non-shareholder stakeholders fixed, the only
way to increase the total amount of value created by the firm is to increase the
“residual claim,” which goes to the shareholders. Thus, it is argued, shareholders
should control corporations so that they can maximize the residual claim and
therefore maximize firm value.55 If shareholders hire managers that they cannot
adequately control, it is feared that managers will manage the corporation in a
manner that improperly directs rents to the managers and therefore does not
maximize firm value.56 These theories, which characterize shareholders as firm
owners and residual claimants, have driven corporate law scholars to focus
squarely on shareholder agency costs as the defining problem in corporate law.
Subpart III.B will explore the ways in which real life corporations diverge
from this classical model, and the implications for the limitations of shareholder
oversight. In recent years, however, structural changes in the U.S. equity markets
have empowered shareholders and therefore substantially reduced shareholdermanager agency costs, providing an opportunity to evaluate the results of their
reduction. The following Subpart details these changes.
2. Shareholder Empowerment Trend
Over the past several decades, a number of trends have emerged that,
combined, have drastically increased shareholders’ influence over corporate
management. The financial theories that facilitated these trends began to develop
as early as the 1950s, while notable changes in the publicly traded equity markets
accumulated over the following decades.
a.

The Foundations of Modern Financial Theory Demonstrated
the Wisdom of Diversified Passive Investment

In the 1950s through 1970s, several important financial theories were
developed which continue to form the foundation of much thinking about
financial markets. Modern portfolio theory, which originated in a paper by
economist Harry Markowitz in 1952, describes how investment portfolios can
be assembled to optimize or maximize expected return given the investor’s
preferred level of risk.57 The capital asset pricing model, which established the
tools to measure the risk, return and performance of investment portfolios, was
also developed during this period.58 Then, around 1970, the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) was established in a paper by economist Eugene

54. Id.
55. Via their residual control rights. “Residual control rights” refers to the rights to make decisions about
the use of corporate assets that are not explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another by contract. Id. at 289.
56. See infra Subpart III.C.
57. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FINANCE 72, 77 (1952).
58. André F. Perold, The Capital Asset Pricing Model, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2004) (“The CAPM was
developed in the early 1960s by William Sharpe (1964), Jack Treynor (1962), John Lintner (1965a, b) and Jan
Mossin (1966).”).
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Fama.59 The fundamental takeaway from the ECMH is that “in an efficient
market, the price of an asset fully reflects all available information about that
asset.”60 The groundbreaking implication of the ECMH is that active trading in
pursuit of speculative gains is useless, so employing the services of professional
traders cannot consistently result in above-average returns.61
While these theories continue to be revised and questioned,62 the
foundational concepts they established remain very influential. Their combined
implication for investors is that a prudent investor will invest in a passively
managed, diverse portfolio.
b.

The Consequent Institutionalization of Shareholdings

Institutional investors became increasingly prominent beginning in the
1980s in large part because they allowed individual investors to follow the
investment advice suggested by the recently developed financial theories
described above.63 Institutional investors pool the smaller investments of many
and invest them according to some strategy developed by the institution. This
pooling of investment assets creates economies of scale and allows investors to
outsource investment decisions to experts.64 The message of the ECMH that
above-market returns are not consistently attainable has drastically increased the
popularity of index funds and exchange traded funds, which do not engage in
active trading strategies.65 The result is that very few households currently own
stock directly. Those households that own stock instead generally hold their
shares through institutional intermediaries.66
Institutional investors can take several forms and serve several purposes.
BlackRock and its “big three” co-members, State Street and Vanguard, are
prominent among these institutions.67 They invest money on behalf of
individuals and also other institutions such as retirement plans, endowments, and
59. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE
383 (1970).The ECMH also has its origins in the work of Paul Samuelson. See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof that
Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965).
60. ANDREW W. LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS 16 (2017); Fama, supra note 59, at 384.
61. LO, supra note 60, at 23.
62. In particular, the perfect efficiency of markets has been widely and convincingly questioned in response
to crises such as the dot-com bubble and the Great Recession. See, e.g., JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE
RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); LO, supra note
60; Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003).
63. LO, supra note 60, at 27 (“It’s no exaggeration to say that the Efficient Markets Hypothesis was
responsible for the emergence of the index mutual fund business.”).
64. POONEH BAGHAI ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., THE NEW GREAT GAME IN NORTH AMERICAN ASSET
MANAGEMENT (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/the-new-greatgame-in-north-american-asset-management.
65. Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 298–300.
66. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1872–73 (2017). In 2016,
44.4% of the U.S. households held fund shares. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 112
fig.6.1 (57th ed., 2017).
67. See Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 299.
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insurance companies.68 Beyond the “big three,” there are many other smaller
asset managers in the industry.69 Moreover, many institutions such as insurance
companies, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds may also hold shares
directly, without intermediation by an asset manager; thus they constitute
another form of institutional investor.
Important among the ecosystem of institutional investors are hedge funds,
which also pool the capital of smaller investors but use riskier investment
practices than other funds, such as leverage, investment in derivatives and short
selling.70 A small but vocal subset of hedge funds also engages in activist
strategies to force changes to the management of the companies in which they
invest.71 Hedge funds engage in activism by acquiring a substantial equity
interest in a publicly traded corporation and using that position to press for
changes in the capital structure or business plan of the corporation.72 The fund
presses for these changes because it believes they will increase the company’s
share price and thus allow for returns to the fund’s investors upon sale of the
shares. Activist hedge funds hold largely undiversified investments, giving them
ample incentive to take on the costs of a campaign against corporate
management.73 While activist funds constitute a small minority of hedge funds,
their influence far exceeds their market share, and executives are widely fearful
of hedge fund activism.74
Importantly, activist hedge funds’ ability to engage in activism depends on
the existence of other institutional investors with sizeable stakes in the target
corporation. Hedge funds themselves take on a sizeable stake in their target
companies, but given the enormous market capitalization of most publicly traded
corporations, they cannot take on a majority stake. Thus, they rely on the votes

68. See, e.g., Our Clients, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/ca/institutional/en/ourclients?nc=true&siteEntryPassthrough=true (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); Our Clients, THE VANGUARD GRP.,
https://about.vanguard.com/our-clients/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
69. See Liam Kennedy, Top 400 Asset Managers 2018: 10 years of Asset Growth, INV. & PENSIONS EUR.
MAG. (last visited Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/top-400-asset-managers/top400-asset-managers-2018-10-years-of-asset-growth/10025004.article.
70. SEC, HEDGE FUNDS INVESTOR BULLETIN HEDGE FUNDS (2012), https://www.sec.gov/
investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf.
71. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 (2007) (noting only five percent of hedge fund assets were devoted to activist
activities in 2006); Strine, supra note 66, at 1885–86 n.47.
72. Strine, supra note 66, at 1886.
73. John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. LAW 545, 548 (2016).
74. See, e.g., THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL REVIEW 2018, ACTIVIST INSIGHT 3 (2018),
https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-Investing-Annual-Review-2018-HiRes.pdf
(documenting the trend of increased activist activity over the last several years); Nabila Ahmed et al., The
World’s Most Feared Investor, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-elliott-management/
(last updated Aug. 22, 2017); William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The Investor CEOs Fear Most
(Dec.
3,
2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-investor-dardenrestaurants/.
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of other institutional shareholders to be able to credibly threaten to vote out
directors. 75
The percentage of institutional holdings of publicly traded stock has
steadily increased since 1980.76 Institutional investors currently hold
approximately eighty percent of U.S. equities.77 The result is that shareholdings
today are much more concentrated than they have been historically. Institutional
investors hold a larger percentage of shares in any one company than virtually
any individual investor could. Thus, the dispersion of shareholdings, which was
a principal impediment to shareholders’ ability to exercise their rights, has
substantially decreased.
c.

Laws and Regulations Are Directed at Increasing Shareholder
Influence Over Corporate Management

While individual investors’ desire to diversify and invest passively resulted
in more concentrated shareholdings, regulators, concerned about agency costs,
simultaneously implemented legal and regulatory changes that increased the
power of the shareholder franchise against a backdrop of state corporation law
that is shareholder-focused.78 A few prominent examples are described below.
In 1988, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued its “Avon Letter,” stating
that investment advisers managing retirement accounts are required to cast a
vote on every matter up for shareholder vote.79 The DOL considered voting these
shares to be consistent with the advisers’ fiduciary duties. This imposed a voting
requirement on many investment funds, increasing the number of shareholder
votes cast in corporate elections.80 In 2003, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issued a similar rule, requiring investment advisers to “adopt
75. They may also rely on the support of other activist funds, a phenomenon referred to as “wolf pack”
activism. See Strine, supra note 66, at 1871.
76. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995–98 (2010); Serdar
Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013 OECD J. 93, 94 (2014), https://
www.oecd.org/corporate/Institutional-investors-ownership-engagement.pdf; OECD, OECD INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS STATISTICS 2009–2016 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecdinstitutional-investors-statistics-2017_instinv-2017-en#page1; Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim,
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished
Working Paper), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2147757.
77. See McGrath, supra note 8.
78. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV. 21, 41 (2018)
(“Shareholder empowerment has been the focal point of immense regulatory and organizational resources in the
past couple decades.”). Delaware, the state where most S&P 500 firms are incorporated, grants corporate
managers substantial leeway in business decisions under the business judgment rule, but requires that business
decisions have some nexus to shareholder returns. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d
1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (clarifying that the promotion of a non-stockholder interests is not protected by the business
judgment rule unless it will eventually lead to stockholder gain).
79. Daniel M. Gallagher, Outsized Power & Influence: The Role of Proxy Advisers 3 (Wash. Legal Found.,
Working Paper No. 187, 2014), http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/GallagherWP8-14.pdf;
Re: Avon Products, Inc. Employee’s Retirement Plan, 1988 ERISA Lexis 19, at *6 (Feb. 23, 1988). Specifically,
investment advisers of funds with twenty-five percent or more of fund shares held in retirement accounts. 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f) (2020).
80. Gallagher, supra note 79, at 3–4.
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policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes
proxies in the best interests of clients” and disclose information about those
votes to their clients.81 This rule extended the influence of the Avon Letter
beyond just funds managing substantial retirement accounts.
In 1992, the SEC enacted changes to proxy rules to make it easier for
shareholders to make 14a-8 shareholder proposals by limiting the circumstances
under which doing so would trigger filing requirements and restrictions.82 Rule
14a-8 requires corporations to include shareholder proposals in their proxy
materials if certain requirements are met.83 Such proposals can address social
and environmental issues, shareholder rights issues, or other corporate
policies.84 While 14a-8 proposals are precatory and therefore non-binding, they
can signal shareholder discontent to corporate managers. This reform therefore
increases shareholders’ voice.85 Indeed, the ability to place shareholder
proposals on the proxy statement was a key contributor to the fifth trend
described below.
In 2010, an amendment to New York Stock Exchange Rule 452 prohibited
brokers from voting shares in director elections when they have not received
instructions from their customers as to how to vote (“uninstructed shares”).86
Prior to this amendment, brokers could vote uninstructed shares at their
discretion.87 Because brokers tended to vote uninstructed shares in favor of
management, this rule change reduced the number of shares voted in favor of
management, increasing the relative weight of shareholder votes against
management.88
The 2011 “Say on Pay” rules adopted as a result of the Dodd Frank Act
require an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote on compensation packages
81. Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. IA-2106, 79 SEC Docket
1673 (Jan. 31, 2003).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). SEC ANN. REP. viii (1992), https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/
1992.pdf. The 1992 rule changes limited the circumstances under which shareholder communications in advance
of a proposal would be considered “proxy solicitations.” Proxy solicitations trigger filing requirements and
restrictions. See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 233, 236 (2000).
83. The requirements include a minimum stake in the company and requirements as to length of the
proposal and timing for filing. If these requirements are not met, the corporation may exclude the proposal only
if it falls into one of thirteen substantive categories that the SEC deems inappropriate for shareholder action.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; Scott Lesmes, Frequently Asked Questions About Shareholder Proposals and Proxy
Access, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questionsabout-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf.
84. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (June 29, 2017),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season/ (noting that,
in 2017, shareholder proposals on social issues were most common, followed by environmental, proxy access,
and political disclosure).
85. Bird & Park, supra note 78, at 39 (“The shareholder proposal mechanism is the most widely recognized
and formal method for shareholders to exercise their voice in corporate decision-making.”).
86. Howard B. Dicker et al., WEIL BRIEFING: SEC DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2009),
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Briefing_SEC_CG_July_9.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 874 (2010).
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for executives.89 The “Say on Pay” rules are intended to allow shareholders to
put management on notice if they are displeased with the compensation provided
to executives. This rule gives corporate executives yet another incentive to
please shareholders.
This list is not comprehensive, and efforts to further empower shareholders
via legislative or regulatory means continue.90 With respect to SEC rulemaking,
the SEC’s mission prominently includes protecting investors,91 so it is
unsurprising that it would regularly issue rules that “constrain management’s
ability to disregard shareholder demands.”92 The effect of any regulation that
enhances shareholders’ ability to influence management works to reduce the
“separation of ownership and control.”
d.

Proxy Advisors Arise, Which Facilitate Coordination Among
Institutional Shareholders

In the midst of the abovementioned changes, a private industry of proxy
advisory firms, or proxy advisors, arose. Proxy advisors compile and analyze
information about publicly traded companies on the basis of which they make
recommendations to institutional investors about how to vote their shares.93
Proxy advisors became prominent in the 1990s to help the increasingly popular
institutional investors reduce their costs of voting.94 In a minority of cases, an
institutional investor will completely outsource its voting function to the proxy
advisor. More often, the institutional investor will pay only for advice and a
voting recommendation.95 The proxy advisory industry is extremely
concentrated with one firm, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), enjoying
dominant status and two firms (ISS and Glass Lewis) enjoying duopolistic
control.96
Proxy advisors enhance institutional investors’ ability to overcome
collective action problems and substantially reduce the costs of complying with
the DOL and SEC voting requirements. While the institutionalization of

89. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as
Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm.
90. See Lucian Bebchuk et al, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
157, 158 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2014); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 669–73 (2010) (describing the “law-reform agenda” put
forth by shareholder proponents to further empower shareholders through lawmaking).
91. Along with maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets and promoting capital formation. See The
Role of the SEC, SEC https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Mar. 20,
2020).
92. Bird & Park, supra note 78, at 35.
93. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 870–71.
94. George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2014).
95. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 870–71.
96. JAMES K. GLASSMAN & HESTER PEIRCE, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., MERCATUS ON
POLICY: HOW PROXY ADVISORY SERVICES BECAME SO POWERFUL 1 (2014), https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/Peirce-Proxy-Advisory-Services-MOP.pdf.
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shareholdings did notable work to reduce the collective action problems faced
by shareholders, even with institutions’ relatively large shareholdings, they still
rarely hold a controlling interest in a firm.97 Thus, coordination among
shareholders is still required to garner enough votes to reject a management
proposal. Moreover, many institutional investors, such as mutual funds and
index funds, exist specifically to provide diversification and therefore are
invested in a very large number of companies.98 So, even though institutions
may hold a relatively large percentage of a corporation’s shares, the breadth of
their holdings means that casting an informed vote at every company could be
prohibitively costly. Proxy advisors enjoy economies of scale, and by
disseminating recommendations widely to many institutional investors, they can
make it easier for institutions to coordinate a vote against management.
Moreover, the fact that there are only two real players in the proxy advisory
industry bolsters their ability to coordinate votes, as the proxy advice available
in the market is essentially limited to two perspectives which do not always
diverge.99
e.

Shareholders Press for Changes Within the Corporation That
Will Further Increase Their Influence

As structural changes have condensed shareholdings, regulatory changes
have increased shareholder influence, proxy advisors have decreased the cost of
coordinated voting, and shareholders have utilized their newfound strength to
press for changes within public corporations that further enhance their power.
First, publicly traded corporations have moved away from plurality
voting.100 Under Delaware corporate law, the vote of only a plurality, not a
majority, of outstanding shares is required to elect a director.101 However, in
recent years, institutional investors have exerted pressure on publicly traded
corporations to adopt a majority-voting standard.102 As of 2015, close to ninety
percent of S&P 500 firms had majority voting requirements.103 Requiring a
majority vote makes it substantially more difficult for directors to win reelection,

97. Activist hedge funds typically have between six and eight percent when they go public with their
campaigns. Strine, supra note 66, at 31. Large asset managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity rarely
hold more than a ten-percent stake in a corporation. See Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 312 tbl.2.
98. WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW 24 (2016).
99. GLASSMAN & PEIRCE, supra note 96.
100. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 872.
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 216 (2020).
102. Majority
Voting
for
Directors,
COUNCIL
OF
INSTITUTIONAL
INV’RS.,
https://www.cii.org/majority_voting_directors (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (“For many years CII has urged
companies to adopt majority voting if a shareholder proposal to adopt the reform received majority support. In
the summer of 2016 CII launched a broader campaign to encourage all companies in the Russell 3000 index to
adopt majority voting, regardless of their history with related shareholder proposals.”).
103. Carol Bowie, ISS 2016 Board Practices Study, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REGULATION (June 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practicesstudy/.
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and the threat of losing reelection makes directors eager to please
shareholders.104
Second, at shareholders’ behest, publicly traded corporations have been
dismantling their staggered boards.105 Historically, most corporations had
“staggered” or “classified” boards, meaning only one third of board members
were up for election each year.106 Staggered boards constrain shareholders’
ability to force changes in management, because they can, at most, replace only
one third of the board each year; replacing the entire board would take three
years. In recent years, many institutional investors have pressured the companies
in which they invest to “de-stagger” their boards.107 As of 2016, ninety percent
of S&P 500 firms had “de-staggered” boards,108 giving shareholders more
opportunities to remove directors and thus more influence over their decision
making.
Moreover, in 2010, under the authorization of the Dodd Frank Act, the SEC
implemented “proxy access” rules to require companies to include in their proxy
materials director candidates nominated by certain shareholders.109 However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned the rule in
2011.110 In the face of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, institutional shareholder
activists effectively pressured many corporations to adopt bylaw changes
establishing proxy access at the corporation level.111 As of February 1, 2018,
sixty-five percent of S&P 500 companies had adopted proxy access
provisions,112 though very few shareholders have utilized their proxy access to
date.113

*****

104. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 873.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Often with the assistance of Harvard Law School’s Shareholder Rights Project. 121 Companies Agreed
to Move Towards Annual Elections, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/
companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
108. Lyuba Goltser & Kaitlin Descovich, ISS Board Practices Study Reflects Focus on Board
Accountability, WEIL GOVERNANCE & SEC. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2017), https://governance.weil.com/whatsnew/iss-board-practices-study-reflects-focus-on-board-accountability/.
109. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9136; 34-62764; IC29384, 99 S.E.C. Docket 694 & 439 (Aug. 25, 2010).
110. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
111. DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 63–
70 (2018).
112. Corporate Governance Report: Proxy Access—Now a Mainstream Governance Practice, SIDLEY (Feb.
1, 2018), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/02/proxy-access.
113. As of July 2017, only one instance of a shareholder using proxy access had occurred. Marc S. Gerber,
Proxy Access: Highlights of the 2017 Proxy Season, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REGULATION (July 1, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/01/proxy-access-highlights-of-the2017-proxy-season/.
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The cumulative result of these forces has been that corporate managers
today are extremely attentive to shareholder concerns.114 The fact that
shareholders have successfully pressed for majority voting, de-staggering boards
and proxy access demonstrates the extent to which their influence had increased
prior to those changes. With these changes in place, their influence can only be
greater. Evidence is abundant that corporate directors and managers are now
substantially more attentive to shareholder concerns than they have been in the
past.115 And, the interaction among the various types of institutional
shareholders means even institutions like BlackRock—which are often thought
of as inactive shareholders—can exert significant sway over corporate managers
because their votes will decide whether a hedge fund’s activist campaign
succeeds.116
Under the traditional principal-agent conception of the corporation, this is
cause for celebration. What those theories deem the most important economic
problem facing corporations appears to have largely been resolved.117 However,
overcoming shareholder agency costs has not proven to be a panacea for
optimizing corporate performance. Instead, in the wake of this apparent
resolution of the agency costs problem, new concerns have arisen about how
corporations are managed.

114. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 720–21; Kahan & Rock, supra note 76, at 995–98; Rock,
supra note 9, at 1910–11.
115. See, e.g., MAURITIUS INST. OF DIR., ENGAGING WITH SHAREHOLDERS—A GUIDE FOR BOARDS, 4
(2014), https://www.afcgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/engaging-with-shareholders-FINAL.pdf (“[O]ver
the last few years, due to new developments in the global environment, shareholder engagement has taken a new
dimension with the relationships between shareholders and issuers demanding more attention.”); Paula Loop et
al., The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REGULATION (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-shareholderactivism/#more-104497 (providing advice to corporate managers on how to prepare for activism by institutional
investors); Lisa Pham & Manuel Baigorri, Companies Engaging with Shareholders More to Avoid Public
Activist Campaigns, BUSINESSDAY (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/2017-12-27companies-engaging-with-shareholders-more-to-avoid-public-activist-campaigns/; SEC—NYU Dialogue on
Securities Markets Regulation, Topic: Shareholder Engagement, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2018)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QouhJ20J90U (discussing, at 2:58:20, how corporate directors are feeling
the pressure of increased shareholder activism from both active and passive investors, and indicates that
corporate boards are increasingly challenged by the task of attending to their corporations’ shareholders and
proxy advisors).
116. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 19 (Harvard Law
School, Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 2019-5, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3247337 (“[I]ndex fund managers have and are increasingly using multiple channels to influence public
companies of all sizes and kinds. Their views . . . matter intensely to the way the core institutions in the U.S.
economy are operating. When a large company’s performance lags, it is at risk of being targeted by a hedge fund
activist. When that occurs, the attitude of the index funds towards that company’s management and strategy will
determine whether the index funds will support, oppose or be neutral regarding the hedge fund’s proposals. In
decisions both ordinary and extraordinary, ranging from cost-cutting to technology investments, M&A
transactions to expenditures on corporate compliance, the perceived pressure on the board will matter.”).
117. Rock, supra note 9, at 1910 (“[S]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted from a managercentric system to a shareholder-centric system.”).
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B. RECENT CONCERNS ABOUT CORPORATE ACTIVITY—“SHORT-TERMISM” OR
“MANAGERIAL FIXATION”
While the shareholder empowerment trend has worked to lessen the longconcerning “separation of ownership and control,” many observers and market
actors have raised new concerns about how shareholders are using this newfound
power to influence corporate managers. These concerns are often referred to as
concerns about “short-termism”—in reference to the idea that corporate
managers may be making decisions to please shortsighted shareholders at the
expense of long-term, sustainable growth. Many of those concerned about shorttermism have called on powerful shareholders to use their influence to redirect
managerial attention to the long term.118 Asset managers like BlackRock, whose
clients are largely investing for long term goals such as retirement, are often
considered particularly well-suited to resolve these concerns. In response to
these calls, Larry Fink’s letter specifically addresses short-termism, as do similar
public communications by State Street and Vanguard.119
The concept of short-termism is quite broad, and over time a number of
perceived flaws in the capital and financial markets have been categorized as
problems of short-termism. Professor Lynne Dallas has meticulously catalogued
the many market forces that have arguably contributed to the problems
associated with short-termism.120 She identifies a number of structural,
informational, behavioral and incentive problems in firms and markets that may
contribute to short termism.121
118. See, e.g., ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 9, 2009),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf;
CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MARKET INTEGRITY/BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORTTERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, ASSET MANAGERS,
INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE (2006), https://www.cfainstitute.org/
en/advocacy/policy-positions/breaking-the-short-term-cycle; POLICY COMM. FOR THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV.,
RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE SIX ESSENTIAL TASKS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND
BUSINESS LEADERS 14–15 (2010), https://www.ced.org/pdf/Restoring-Trust-in-Corporate-Governance.pdf;
MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=938466.
119. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2 (“Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or
private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will
succumb to short-term pressures.”); R. William McNabb III, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies
Worldwide, VANGUARD (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governanceletter-to-companies.pdf (“[W]e promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the
long-term value of [our investors’] investments.”); Ronald P. O’Hanley, Proxy Letter, STATE ST. GLOB.
ADVISORS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/
Letter-and-ESG-Guidelines.pdf (“Each year our asset stewardship team identifies specific areas that may impact
value over the long term.”).
120. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance 37 J. CORP. LAW
264 (2012).
121. Structural problems include how periods of low interest rates encourage firms (and individuals) to incur
too much debt, how competition for funds among asset managers cause asset managers to invest in assets that
will produce short term returns, and how technological advances that have increased the speed of trading have
also increased volatility, which increases pressure on firms to engage in earnings management. Id. at 269–70,
273. Informational asymmetries between managers and markets can also foster “myopia” by creating a prisoner’s
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The lesson from Professor Dallas’s extensive list is that there are numerous
potential sources of pressures on investors and managers that could lead to
value-reducing decision-making. But, the vast majority of these pressures are
driven by shareholders. Broadly, she points to forces that encourage investors
and analysts to over-value the short term and the way in which those
perspectives impact managerial decision-making.122 Any time a manager is
making decisions based on how they will appear to the market, the perspectives
of shareholders are driving those decisions. The many structural, informational
and behavioral problems of investors can easily be transferred to corporate
managers who are strongly incentivized to please their corporations’ very
influential shareholders. Thus, the increasing influence of shareholders
described in the prior Subpart contributes to and exacerbates “short-term” or
otherwise misdirected pressures.
This investor influence is feared to be value-reducing because when
corporate managers focus narrowly on meeting investors’ imperfect demands,
they neglect other important value-creating interests. Examples of valuereducing activities by corporate managers include:
“[O]ffering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, engaging in
overproduction to lower costs of goods sold . . . and reducing discretionary
expenses aggressively to improve margins,” such as research and
development expenses, maintenance expenses, marketing expenses,
employee-training expenses, or employee downsizing with the loss of
experienced workers.123

Many of these activities come at the expense of returns to corporate
stakeholders such as employees and customers. These types of measures may
allow managers to report results that appeal to investors in the short run, in the
form of increased profits and therefore increased share prices. However, they
may also result in less productive companies in future periods. This is a recurring
theme in discussions of short-termism—the idea that short-termism reduces
firms’ long term value because it causes managers to neglect value-creating
stakeholder interests.
This Article shifts the focus of discussion by arguing that non-shareholder
stakeholders will always receive relatively less attention as shareholders gain

dilemma between firms, incentivizing managers to provide misleading (and unsustainable) signals to the market,
disincentivizing value creation, and causing managers to disregard useful private information about a course of
action if that information cannot be effectively communicated to the market. Id. at 268. She argues that the
behavioral biases of market actors contribute to short-termism by causing them to over-discount the potential
impact of low-frequency shocks, feel excessively optimistic about the future, and follow the short-term behavior
of groups. Id. at 270. Finally, firm managers are incentivized to engage in short term behavior for personal
reputational and financial reasons and to maintain or bolster the firm’s reputation. See id. at 269–73.
122. See Dallas, supra note 120.
123. Dallas, supra note 120, at 278 (quoting Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real
Activities Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 336 (2006)); cf. DOMINIC BARTON ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB.
INST., MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SHORT-TERMISM 7 (2017) (finding that firms with a long-term
focus invested more in R&D, hired more employees, and exhibited better financial performance than those with
a short-term focus).
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more influence. This is so regardless of who those shareholders are and what
their investment horizon might be. Managerial attention is a finite resource. A
greater proportion of managerial attention to shareholders must mean a smaller
proportion devoted to other stakeholders. Therefore, problems of value-reducing
stakeholder neglect are really problems of disproportionate shareholder power,
broadly, which need not be attributable to time horizon, or short-termism.
The concept of short-termism, while widely discussed, is not universally
accepted. A number of empirical studies have sought to measure whether shorttermism exists and the extent to which it is caused by shareholder pressures. The
results have pointed in divergent directions.124 As was the case for the studies of
stakeholder engagement discussed in Subpart I.B above, the potential sources of
short-term pressure are so diverse and interconnected, that conclusively proving
or disproving the existence of this phenomenon is likely an insurmountable task,
at least in the foreseeable future.
A prominent theoretical objection to the concept of short-termism is its
implications for the existence of efficient capital markets.125 If shareholders are
regularly able to force changes in a corporation that lead to a short-term increase
in stock price, that implies that the market for these stocks is regularly
inefficient. In an efficient market, the current price of a stock should reflect all
publicly available information about the future cash flows to the company, and
so any expected future decrease should be reflected today.
These objections lose much of their force when the problem is framed as
arising from a misallocation of managerial attention and not as a question of
investment horizon. Viewed in this light, the most relevant characteristics of the
capital markets identified by the short-termism discussion are: (1) the substantial
influence that shareholders have over corporate managers; (2) the resultant

124. Studies supporting the existence of short-termism include: John Asker et al., Corporate Investment and
Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 384 (2015) (finding that public companies whose
stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities);
Francois Brochet et al., Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia, 20 REV.
ACCT. STUD. 1122, 1132 tbl.3 (2015) (finding the content of corporate conference calls indicate myopic behavior
among managers); Martijn Cremers et al., Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value
(unpublished working paper) (finding that an inflow of short-term institutional investors predicts an increase in
the likelihood that firms cut investment in research and development). Studies questioning the existence of a
short termism problem include: Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1117 (2015) (finding no evidence that hedge fund activism causes temporary short term
stock price increases); Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J.
FIN. 2481, 2481–82 (2009) (showing that transient shareholders in the U.S. markets can encourage investment);
and Joel F. Houston et al., To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings
Guidance, 27 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 143, 179 (2010) (finding no increase in long-term investment after firms
cease earnings guidance).
125. See Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 19,
31 (2015); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden
Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 532–33 (2002); Tim Worstall, The Problem With Hillary: If Investors Are Short
Term Then How Can We Have Investment Bubbles?, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2015, 5:26 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/08/02/the-problem-with-hillary-if-investors-are-short-termthen-how-can-we-have-investment-bubbles/#8ba8a6fd9775.
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devaluation of the needs and preferences of other stakeholders; and (3) the
consequent loss in firm value. Focusing on these characteristics means that
empirical tests of changes in firm value at different points in time are
substantially less relevant because the argument is no longer dependent on a
particular time frame. Moreover, the efficient markets objection loses its
relevance because the market’s ability to value the company is not deemed to
change over time. Rather, shareholders are deemed consistently unable to
accurately value stakeholder relationships across time periods.126 The remainder
of this Article will therefore use the term “managerial fixation” to refer to this
problem in order to emphasize the central role played by managers’
disproportionate attention to shareholders, as a class, and leave to the side
questions of time horizon.
*****
As the above discussion has demonstrated, the problem of agency costs
arising from the “separation of ownership and control” has substantially
diminished. However, resolving this problem does not appear to have resulted
in optimally performing corporations. Instead, new concerns about shorttermism have arisen, which point to the existence of value-reducing managerial
fixation that agency cost theories cannot explain.127 The following Part describes
an alternative theory of the corporation, the team production theory, which
predicts and provides an explanation for these apparent problematic
consequences of the shareholder empowerment trend.
III. TEAM PRODUCTION AND SHAREHOLDER LIMITATIONS
Contrary to the theories focused on shareholder-manager agency costs
discussed above, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory of
corporate law asserts that shareholders’ rights are properly limited. The team
production theory128 focuses on an alternate economic problem faced by
corporations—that of team production—to explain the roles of shareholders,
corporate boards and other corporate constituencies. The team production theory
provides a compelling explanation for the concerns about managerial fixation
that have arisen in the wake of a great wave of shareholder empowerment.
However, it leaves unanswered questions about shareholders’ limited ability to
correct for managerial fixation. This Part describes the team production theory’s
explanatory power and proposes a response to those unanswered questions.

126. See infra Subpart III.B for a description of this limitation.
127. Dallas, supra note 120, at 273 (“Unlike the well-known agency cost theory, which holds that agency
costs are minimized when managers are disciplined by market pressures . . . managerial myopia theories explain
why managers ‘caring too much’ about current stock prices leads to myopic decision making.”).
128. As is discussed below, Blair and Stout’s team production theory of corporate law is based on theoretical
work about team production in economic literature. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “team
production” or the “team production theory” herein refer to Blair and Stout’s team production theory of corporate
law, and not the underlying economic theories.
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A. TEAM PRODUCTION
1.

Overview of the Team Production Theory of Corporate Law

The team production theory asserts that viewing shareholders as the owners
of corporate assets who should be empowered to control those assets is not only
normatively undesirable but also descriptively inaccurate. As a descriptive
matter, it acknowledges that equity owners are, indeed, the common owners of
firm assets in businesses formed as proprietorships, partnerships and closely
held firms. Corporations, and especially publicly held corporations, however,
are quite different. As was discussed in Subpart I.A above, the corporate form
originated from a desire to ensure equity capital contributors could not freely
withdraw their assets from the business.129 Thus, the forfeiture of control over
assets is a fundamental characteristic of the corporate form. This is why
corporate shareholders don’t exhibit any of the rights in a corporation that are
associated with ownership or control and why their rights to control the
corporation and its assets are explicitly and substantially limited by law.130
As a normative matter, the team production theory does not view
shareholder-manager agency costs as the primary economic problem faced by
corporations because shareholder equity is not the only input necessary for
corporate production. Instead, this theory focuses on the problem of organizing
joint production in teams, or “team production.”
The team production problem is an economic problem that has been studied
by economists since the 1970s.131 It arises when the production of some output
requires the inputs of many individuals.132 The whole of the output produced by
the team will be greater than the sum of the inputs produced by any individual,133
and so there will be greater positive contribution to the economy if teams come
together to jointly produce things. However, making a contribution to the team
129. This allows more security for long-term business endeavors. See supra Subpart I.A.
130. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 261; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–12, 220, 251(c), 327 (2020).
Nonetheless, shareholders do have rights that other stakeholders do not have. Blair and Stout acknowledge that
the mere fact that shareholders are the only stakeholder group with any such rights does seem to imply that they
enjoy a favored position vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Nonetheless, they proffer two possible explanations as to
why shareholders alone have voting rights. First, shareholder voting rights, when properly limited, may serve
the interests of all stakeholder groups, not just shareholders. A poorly managed corporation can compromise
returns to all team members, but granting voting rights to all stakeholders would be untenable. So, the
shareholders serve as a backstop in instances of extreme managerial misconduct. Second, the voting rights could
be seen as compensation to shareholders for the unique risks they take on as equity investors. Equity investors
have much less access to management, and their voting rights can be seen as making up for that distance. Blair
& Stout, supra note 12, at 312–14.
131. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 265 (“One of the first serious attempts by economists to explore the
problem of organizing joint production in teams can be found in a 1972 paper . . . .” (citing Armen A. Alchian
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972))).
132. Id. at 265 (“[D]efined team production as ‘production in which 1) several types of resources are
used . . . 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all
resources used in team production belong to one person.’” (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131)).
133. Id. at 269.
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involves uncertainty and therefore risk with respect to whether any one
contributor of resources will be adequately compensated for her contribution.
Individuals will be unwilling to contribute to the team if they do not have
assurances that they will receive a share of the profits from the production that
exceeds their opportunity cost of participating. And, the profits from production
will be a function of the quality and quantity of contributions to the team.134 The
economic problem, then, is how to attract and maintain high-quality inputs to
the team.135
While potential team members could hypothetically contract to an
agreement about allocating profits, there is no efficient time at which team
members could do so. If the team members agree ex ante to a division of the
surplus, all team members will have incentives to shirk. However, if they attempt
to divide up shares of profit ex post, all team members will be incentivized to
engage in rent-seeking, the prospect of which could deter any individual from
contributing to the team in the first place.136
One solution to this problem identified in the economic literature is to
insert an outsider into the productive activity who can control the team’s assets,
allocate assets among team members, and fire individual team members or break
up the team.137 While this arrangement requires the individual team members to
cede some control of their productive capacity, it also limits shirking and deters
rent seeking so that the team members feel confident they will receive an
adequate share of the profit generated by the team production. The outsider is
referred to as a “mediating hierarch” whose role is to “exercise [] control in a
fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the team as a whole.”138 The
mediating hierarch is charged with ensuring potential team contributors that
their expected return from engaging in team production exceeds the cost of
ceding some control over their productive capacity.
Corporations are entities engaged in team production. They require the
“firm-specific investments” of many—equity capital, lending, supplies, labor,
customers, environmental resources—in order to produce goods and services
that we hope will have a net positive social impact on the economy.139 Blair and

134. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, at 778–79.
135. While early work on the economic problem of team production emphasized designing incentives to
prevent shirking among employees once they were part of the firm. Id.; see also Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECONOMICS 324 (1982). Blair and Stout rely more heavily on the later work of
Rajan and Zingales, which emphasized the prior need to attract specific investments to the firm before the
problem of preventing shirking can ever arise. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the
Firm, 113 Q.J. ECONOMICS 387, 390 (1998).
136. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 249-50.
137. Id. at 274 (citing Rajan & Zingales, supra note 135, at 422).
138. Id. at 271.
139. While early economic work on team production focused on the productive inputs of employees—see
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, and Holmstrom, supra note 135—Blair and Stout explicitly expand the
realm of relevant team members to also include shareholders, creditors, and community members, etc. on the
basis that these groups also make firm-specific investments that contribute to the corporation’s productive
capacity. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 276 n.61.
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Stout argue that in corporations, the board of directors plays the role of the
mediating hierarch.140 The board’s allegiances, therefore, should be not only to
shareholders, but to all the individuals whose “firm-specific investments” are
essential to optimizing corporate output. In the board’s role hiring and
supervising the chief executive officer, it should ensure that the CEO’s
allegiances are similarly broad. This theory acknowledges that, while
shareholder capital, and oversight, are essential to corporate output, so are the
inputs of many other stakeholders.141 The board should thus act as a mediating
hierarch “whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests in a
fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays
together.”142
Because the team production theory argues that boards should be
accountable to all team members, it views shareholders’ control rights as
properly limited. That is, the fact that shareholders have limited rights under
corporate law, and that they face collective action problems in exercising those
rights, is a positive attribute, not a flaw, in corporate law.143 If shareholders (or
any other team member) were able to easily use their control rights to advocate
for their own self-interest, this would disrupt the equilibrium of stakeholder
interests that the board is tasked with maintaining, and thereby disincentivize the
contribution of “firm-specific investments” from the neglected stakeholders.144
In more concrete terms, if shareholders are disproportionately influential,
corporate managers will devote a larger proportion of their attention to
shareholders and therefore a smaller proportion of their attention to other
stakeholders, such as employees. A decreased share of attention to employees
will cause managers to be less familiar with or attentive to the preferences and
desires of their employees. If, as a consequence, employee interests are
neglected, we should expect the firm to attract fewer, or less qualified,
employees. With a smaller or less qualified workforce, production will suffer as
will profit, or firm value.
Under the team production theory it is therefore desirable that shareholders
may only be able to exert control in cases of extreme managerial misconduct so
that managers can devote adequate attention to all stakeholders. Only by doing
so can they attract to the firm the quality and quantity of inputs necessary for
maximizing firm value.145

140. Id. at 319.
141. Id. at 278.
142. Id. at 281.
143. Id. at 321–22.
144. John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies and Enforcement 3 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 135/2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555 (noting that agency costs
exist between a firm and its non-shareholder stakeholders).
145. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 312.
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Implications for Current Trends

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s seminal article developing the team
production theory was published in 1999,146 at a time when the trend toward
increased shareholder power was in motion, but shareholders had not yet reached
the level of unprecedented influence that they enjoy today.147 However, applying
the theory to the current state of the U.S. equity markets—in which shareholders
have very substantial influence over corporate managers—the team production
theory would predict an outcome that substantially resembles current concerns
about short-termism, or managerial fixation.
The team production theory predicts that if shareholders were to amass
substantial influence over management, management would be forced to devote
relatively less attention to the needs of other corporate stakeholders, and we
would expect that their interests would be neglected, to the detriment of
corporate production. Recent concerns about short-termism, or managerial
fixation, point to a fear that this outcome has, indeed, come to pass. Shareholders
in the public U.S. equity markets currently exert an unprecedented level of
influence over corporate managers.148 In the wake of this change came
discussions of short-termism, which this Article argues is actually a problem of
managerial fixation. These discussions point to the neglect of non-shareholder
stakeholders such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and
communities.149 These constituencies are stakeholders that make firm-specific
investments under the team production theory.150
The team production theory therefore provides a useful starting point to
explain the managerial fixation that has arisen in the wake of shareholder
empowerment. It implies that the empowerment of shareholders has led to the
neglect of other stakeholders and that disproportionately powerful shareholders
can always be expected to have this result. It also explains why shareholder
empowerment not only negatively impacts stakeholders, but also can reduce the
value of firms. It points out that corporations need the inputs of all their
stakeholders to produce goods and services. If stakeholders’ interests are not
adequately addressed, the corporation will not succeed in attracting the mix of
stakeholder inputs to the firm that will optimize the corporation’s output.
Team production thereby also provides an answer to the question of what
market changes precipitated Larry Fink’s letter. It suggests that the very force
that gave Larry Fink a visible public platform—shareholder empowerment—led
to managerial fixation, calls on powerful shareholders to protect other

146. Id.
147. Rock, supra note 9, at 1910 (discussing the process of shareholder empowerment began in the 1980s).
148. See e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 71, at 1022; Rock, supra note 9, at 1922–23; Bratton & Wachter,
supra note 90, at 720–21.
149. Supra Subpart II.B.
150. The often-mentioned concerns about research, development, and innovation, while not specifically the
direct interests of a specific group of team members, are nonetheless issues that are important to both customers
who desire new and improved products and employees in innovative roles at the corporation.
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stakeholder interests,151 and finally Fink’s letter and similar reactions from other
institutions.152
The next logical question, then, is whether this approach can work. Can we
expect that powerful shareholders such as BlackRock can wield their influence
so as to monitor and improve a corporation’s relationships with its other
stakeholders? To this inquiry, team production provides a somewhat paradoxical
response. Team production predicts two outcomes to follow from
disproportionate shareholder empowerment: (1) that other stakeholders’
interests will be neglected and (2) that that neglect will come at the cost of firm
production and value. These outcomes are paradoxical because we expect firm
value to be of paramount concern to shareholders. Shareholders are well
incentivized to ensure they use their influence in a manner that does not impair
firm value. The questions remains, then, why shareholders cannot simply use
their substantial influence to monitor other stakeholders’ interests and thereby
reduce the costs of managerial fixation. The following Subpart explores why
shareholders cannot be effective monitors of corporate impacts on other
stakeholders, in spite of their financial incentives to do so.
B. SHAREHOLDER LIMITATIONS
Team production explains how managerial attention to non-shareholder
stakeholders promotes firm value by improving the quality or quantity of those
stakeholders’ inputs. A number of studies support this connection between
stakeholder management and increasing firm value,153 and the Fink letter and
the trend of which it is a part are an acknowledgment by market participants,
including shareholders, that attention to other stakeholders is necessary to
maximize shareholder returns.154 Thus, at least initially, there appears to be logic
to the approach of calling on shareholders to resolve problems of managerial
fixation. If institutional investors are currently the constituency with the greatest
influence over management decision-making, it would seem a fitting solution to
have them use their influence to ensure corporate managers are effectively
tending to the interests of other stakeholder groups.
Nonetheless, while this coincidence of interests provides investors with the
incentives to advocate for other stakeholders, insurmountable information
asymmetries prevent them from accessing the information necessary to do so
effectively. Only the stakeholders themselves can provide the necessary
information about what they require to induce their participation in the corporate
team, and they do not reveal this information to shareholders. The remainder of

151. See Dominic Barton & Marc Wiseman, Focusing Capital on the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–
Feb. 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/01/focusing-capital-on-the-long-term; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at
720–21; Kahan & Rock, supra note 76, at 995–98; Rock, supra note 9, at 1910–11.
152. See supra note 115.
153. See supra Subpart I.B and accompanying notes 27–36.
154. But see supra note 6.
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this Subpart explores the origins of these information asymmetries and the
obstacles to overcoming them.
1. Incomplete Stakeholder Contracts
As was discussed in Subpart II.A.1 above, agency cost theories that argue
in favor of shareholder empowerment are based on the assumption that contracts
with all non-shareholder stakeholders are complete. Discussions of “contracts”
in this context refer to a broad category of agreements between corporations and
their stakeholders. These agreements do not always take the form of legally
binding documents signed by both parties. The term “contracts” here includes
legally binding agreements, but also less formal “relationships characterized by
reciprocal expectations and behavior.”155 To say that a contract is complete is to
say that every possible contingency is contemplated by the contract.156 If a
contract is complete, then no matter what state of the world arises in the future,
the contract will tell the parties exactly what their obligations are in that scenario.
However, in reality, creating a complete contract is virtually impossible. As
Professors Paul Milgrom and John Roberts describe:
Complete contracting requires freely imagining all the myriad contingencies
that might arise during the contract term, costlessly determining the
appropriate actions and division of income to take in each contingency,
describing all these verbally with enough precision that the terms of the
contract are clear, arriving at an agreement on these terms, and doing all this
so that the parties to the contract are motivated to follow its terms. 157

It is easy to see that such a level of specificity is not realistically possible
in almost all cases, as the number of future states of the world is probably
infinite. Thus, the classical assumption that all contracts with non-shareholder
stakeholders are complete is not true.158 Instead, these contracts will be
incomplete to varying degrees.
Some stakeholder contracts, such as those with lenders, may be rather
detailed even if incomplete. Contracts for corporate loans are generally
negotiated at length among sophisticated parties with sophisticated lawyers, and
contemplate a number of future scenarios. Nonetheless, the option for future
renegotiation of terms always remains open, uncontemplated future states of the
world are always possible,159 and a healthy corporation will negotiate a number
of debt agreements over the course of its life. Thus, corporate managers will
have repeated opportunities to negotiate and renegotiate the terms of debt over

155. William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 388 (1990)
(suggesting that the term “contracting relationships” may better capture this broader conception of “contracts”).
156. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1731, 1732 (2017).
157. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 52, at 289.
158. Hart, supra note 156, at 1732 (“Actual contracts are not like this, as lawyers have realized for a long
time.”).
159. See, e.g., Gregory H. Shill, Boilerplate Shock: Sovereign Debt Contracts as Incubators of Systemic
Risk, 89 TUL. L. REV. 751, 755 (2015) (discussing how standard contract terms in debt contracts can have
unexpectedly detrimental effects in the event of large economic shocks).
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time. Other stakeholder contracts, such as corporations’ agreements with at-will
employees are highly incomplete in that they have very few specified terms.160
Most U.S. employees are employed “at-will” and thus not subject to any specific
employment contract.161 So, the bargain between an employee and her employer
about most employment terms—schedule, work responsibilities, grounds for
termination—are not specified ex ante but rather allow for flexibility over time.
Because of the existence of these contractual gaps, the members of a
particular stakeholder group are continually engaged in ongoing negotiations
with the corporations to fill in these gaps as new situations arise. Professors
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have described how, in non-union
workplaces, norms have arisen according to which employers will only
terminate employees for-cause, even though the at-will employment doctrine
requires no such constraint.162 They explain that these norms have developed
because if potential employees knew that they could be terminated arbitrarily,
they would not choose to join the firm in the first place.163 That is, in the jargon
of team production, employees need ex ante assurance that the corporation’s
management will act as an effective mediating hierarch to protect their interests
adequately before they will commit their firm specific investments to the
corporation. A norm against arbitrary termination provides some assurance to
potential employees that the firm will not act in a way that makes an employee’s
choice to join the firm ex post costly to the employee.164 Thus, by devoting
resources and attention to employee needs and preferences, a corporation can
glean information from employees and potential employees about what
assurances are necessary to promote employee recruitment, retention, and
productivity. It can then fill contractual gaps in a way that will optimally attract
employees to the firm.
Similar scenarios can be crafted for other stakeholder groups. Consumers
present a very similar case because customer contracts are usually similarly
incomplete. Businesses, fundamentally, should be striving to provide goods and
services demanded by their consumers. They should be engaging with their
consumers to understand what products and services will induce the consumers
to purchase the corporation’s goods or services. Even in the realm of more highly
specified contracts such as a loan agreement, when an unanticipated event occurs
that, for example, could lead to the corporation not meeting one of its covenants,

160. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1917 (describing non-union internal labor markets as examples of
highly incomplete contracts).
161. The at-will employment presumption, which is recognized in all U.S. states except Montana, is stated
as, “[a]bsent an agreement, statutory provision, or public-policy rule to the contrary, an employment relationship
is terminable at the will of either party.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 3.01 (AM. LAW INST., 2006).
162. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1917.
163. Id. at 1930 (“If the firm could discharge without cause, it could use such a threat to appropriate an
additional share of the joint surplus ex post. The threat of such ex post appropriation would . . . stand in the way
of optimal investments in match ex ante.”).
164. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 272.
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the corporation must negotiate with the creditor to an outcome that preserves as
much of the firm’s value as possible.
Given that stakeholder relationships are not, in fact, complete contracts,
residual returns can be distributed not only to shareholders, but also to these
other stakeholders as a result of the negotiation of their unspecified contract
terms. This means that the unspecified contract terms are areas where residual
control is exercised.165 That is, the right to make decisions about undefined
contract terms is part of the residual control, and it can either be granted to
shareholders (as agency cost theories suggest) or to corporate managers (via the
board as “mediating hierarch,” as the team production theory suggests). The
question then becomes which group—shareholders or managers—can exercise
this control in a manner that maximizes firm value.
A key observation in answering this question is that a corporation’s
relationships with its stakeholders are its means to creating value. It cannot
produce profit without employees, customers, and other inputs.166 Therefore,
exercising residual control is not simply a matter of making choices about how
to distribute the residual returns among stakeholders. Rather, the quantity of
residual return available for distribution is a function of the manner in which
residual control is exercised. So, maximizing profit, and thus the residual return,
depends on engaging with stakeholders in a manner that optimizes the quality
and quantity of their inputs to the corporation. Control over these decisions
should therefore go to the party that is best able to negotiate stakeholder
contracts. The following two Subparts describe why shareholders are not the
best-equipped party.
2.

Information Asymmetries

When attention to stakeholder concerns is expected to have a positive
impact on share price, shareholders will nonetheless be poorly positioned to
monitor management attention to these issues due to information asymmetries
between shareholders and managers.
Underlying agency cost theories is an assumption that shareholders have
all the information they need to effectively maximize firm value. If markets were
strong form efficient—that is, if all material public and nonpublic information
about a company were incorporated into its stock price—then it would be
appropriate for boards to act as agents that specifically and exclusively do the
bidding of shareholders.167 If shareholders possessed all possible information
about the value of the firm, they would then always be the group best positioned
to maximize firm value. However, most can agree that markets are not strong

165. Hart, supra note 156, at 1732.
166. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 12 (2010) (“[T]he
only way to maximize value sustainably is to satisfy stakeholder interests.”); supra Subpart I.B.
167. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 696 (“[S]trong-form efficiency would support a nearly
unassailable case for shareholder empowerment.”).
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form efficient.168 Instead, firm managers have private information to which the
firm’s shareholders do not have access, so informational asymmetries exist
between corporate managers and shareholders.169 Consequently, markets will
not always accurately value a firm,170 and mediating between market signals and
inside information becomes what Professors William Bratton and Michael
Wachter call the “intrinsic management function.”171 That is, what we want from
corporate managers is that they combine signals from the market with the inside
information about the company that they have, and use that to make management
decisions that maximize firm value.
In their article analyzing the role of shareholder empowerment in the 2008
financial crisis, Bratton and Wachter describe the crisis as having been
precipitated by managers who were too focused on meeting the demands of
imperfectly informed shareholders.172 In the years preceding the financial crisis,
high-risk business strategies worked very well in the sense that they resulted in
high returns to shareholders.173 Shareholder appetite for these high returns
strongly incentivized managers to continue investing in mortgage-backed
securities, even as it became increasingly evident that the mortgage bubble was
unsustainable and the magnitude of the risks involved was extraordinary.
Managers of financial firms had access to information about these risks that
shareholders did not have, but strong pressures from shareholders seeking everincreasing returns prevented most managers from acting on this inside
information.174 The result, we now know, was that many mispriced assets
plummeted in value as housing prices began to fall, forcing a liquidity crisis, an
enormous government bailout, and a deep economic recession.
Focusing on the 2008 financial crisis, Bratton and Wachter’s discussion
emphasizes unobservable financial risk that made shareholder signals
dramatically inefficient in the lead up to the crash.175 However, financial risk is
not the only type of information that can be unobservable to shareholders. The
effects of many stakeholder-affecting management decisions are similarly
unobservable to shareholders because this information is revealed during the
internal and ongoing negotiation of incomplete contract terms with those
stakeholders. The management of stakeholder relationships happens on an
ongoing basis within the corporation, and managers therefore have access to

168. COLIN READ, THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIST: BACHELIER, SAMUELSON, FAMA, ROSS, TOBIN,
105 (2013); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 691.
169. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 696–97.
170. Id. at 696 (“Information asymmetries make it difficult for the market to project accurately the free cash
flows that the corporation will produce.”).
171. Id. at 697.
172. See id. at 656.
173. Id. at 721.
174. Id. at 722 (“[T]he result of not giving the market what it wants can be painful. The new corporate policy
is unlikely to be rewarded precisely because the stock market believes the existing high-leverage corporate
strategy, duly ratified by a rising stock price, is the correct one.”).
175. Id. at 723.
AND SHILLER
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information about those negotiations that shareholders do not have.176 This
asymmetry of information means that shareholders cannot incorporate this
information into their assessment of the firm’s value, so managing to shareholder
expectations cannot be expected to maximize the value created by these
relationships. Shareholder opinions about how to optimize stakeholder
relationships will not be as well-informed as the opinions of managers. So,
managing to shareholder expectations will force managers to ignore valueenhancing information to which they have ready access, to the detriment of firm
value.177
3.

Challenges to Overcoming Information Asymmetries

If informational asymmetries prevent shareholders from effectively acting
on their incentives to monitor and protect other stakeholder interests, the next
logical question is whether those information asymmetries can be overcome by
transferring to shareholders the information they lack. This Subpart argues that
they cannot for at least two reasons: (1) the passive nature of public stock market
investments and (2) the complexity, and thus costs, of reporting on stakeholder
outcomes.
First, the passivity of shareholders is a characteristic fundamental to public
stock markets.178 Blair and Stout’s team production theory is explicitly a theory
of public corporations.179 Shareholders in public corporations are passive,
retrospective monitors of corporate behavior180 who voluntarily cede ultimate
control to the board of directors.181 While modern shareholders may have
substantial influence over corporate managers, including the board of directors,
it is an influence that originates outside the corporation. Public shareholders are

176. One notable exception to this may be the instance in which a shareholder represents an important
constituent group of the corporation. Professor David Webber has described in detail the success that pension
funds have had in engaging in shareholder activism on behalf of workers. WEBBER, supra note 111, at 178–79.
In such a case, the shareholder may have better information than usual about the stakeholder relationship. Id.
However, such situations are limited to a unique class of shareholders and unique instances of alignment between
those shareholders and stakeholder issues facing the corporation. Id. These instances, while an important antidote
to managerial fixation, do not overcome the more general observation that most shareholders will lack adequate
information about most stakeholder relationships to effectively monitor those relationships. Id.
177. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
489, 506 (2013) (“[A]s you move away from an offer on the table to buy the company . . . to continuous business
decisionmaking over time, the meaning of a market-price signal becomes less and less clear and information
asymmetries present more of a problem.”).
178. The term “passive” is used here in a broad sense to refer to a fundamental characteristic of public stock
markets. While, the term “passive” is often also used to describe as class of investment funds that are not actively
managed, that is a much narrower concept and is not the intended meaning here.
179. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 256 (“[T]he team production approach may help explain why so many
large enterprises are organized as publicly-traded corporations, rather than as partnerships, limited liability
corporations, closely held companies, or other business forms that give investors tighter control.”).
180. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 9–10 (2001).
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020).
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not involved in managing the internal workings of the firm.182 This is in stark
contrast to privately owned businesses that are often closely held by their
founders or by professional private equity or venture capital firms. In privately
held firms, it is common that equity holders will be intimately involved in firm
management.183 The choice to operate as a public firm, on the other hand, is a
choice to abandon that model and instead distribute equity to dispersed public
shareholders.184 Similarly, a choice by an investor to purchase shares of a
publicly traded corporation is a choice to invest in a highly liquid asset that will
not require the investor’s ongoing attention as a manager.185 The advantages of
this passivity would be lost if shareholders were to engage deeply in overseeing
the internal operations of the corporation. Only an intimate involvement in the
internal affairs of the corporation could meaningfully reduce the stakeholder
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders. By their nature,
public shareholders are neither positioned nor equipped to engage in this type of
involvement.
Second, information about a corporation’s relationships with its many
stakeholders is qualitatively very distinct from financial information and
therefore not readily reduced to numerical metrics. Those working in the area of
social enterprise have been at the forefront of developing metrics to measure
social output. The issue has continuously presented numerous challenges, not
the least of which is the sheer number of stakeholders affected by business
actions. Professor Sarah Dadush, in an extensive analysis of two leading
indicators used in the impact investing investment market, concluded that these
“tools do not in fact measure impact because [social and environmental impacts
are] too complicated and controversial to evaluate.”186 Professor Galit Sarfaty
conducted an extensive study of the “leading standard for corporate
sustainability reporting,”187 and concluded that the use of quantitative indicators
to measure corporate sustainability is problematic.188 Among other issues, the
indicators promote only superficial compliance while their weaknesses are often
overlooked due to the “authoritative quality of numbers.”189 Thus, the most
extensive recent efforts to create reporting metrics on social outcomes have
substantial deficiencies.
182. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) (“[I]t is well established that
stockholders of a corporation subject to the DGCL may not directly manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, at least without specific authorization in either the statute or the certificate of incorporation.”).
183. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 281, 251–52 n.8–9 (describing how most state laws do not require
private firms to operate through a board and instead default to direct management by equity owners).
184. Id. at 322.
185. Blair, supra note 17, at 43–44.
186. Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS
392, 423 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012).
187. Galit A. Sarfaty, Measuring Corporate Accountability Through Global Indicators, in THE QUIET
POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND THE RULE OF LAW 103, 105 (Sally Engle
Merry et al. eds., 2015).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Dadush, supra note 186, at 423.
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Moreover, the types of stakeholder interests that are most relevant to firm
value will differ from corporation to corporation. Different corporations require
different employees, have different customers, and have unique relationships
with their other stakeholders. One key characteristic of financial reporting under
the U.S. securities laws that has made that disclosure system effective is that it
requires standardized reporting that is comparable across companies.190 This
type of standardization is not reasonably achievable in the realm of stakeholder
relationships because the relevant stakeholder groups and the relevant aspects of
those relationships will vary across companies. Moreover, these relationships
are vast, complex and dynamic. As a corporation’s business strategy changes
over time, the optimal mix of stakeholder inputs will also change. Thus, the
relevant data points for disclosure would be a constantly moving target. Any
attempt to comprehensively report on stakeholder relationships would be
prohibitively expensive due to the ongoing and nuanced nature of these
relationships.191 As Professors Rock and Wachter have noted, “[i]t is always
more difficult to prove a case to a third party than to learn the facts
independently.”192 Moreover, very detailed disclosure on stakeholder
relationships would likely reveal information about internal strategy that could
compromise corporations’ competitive positions. Managerial attention is
therefore best focused on managing the corporation’s incomplete contracts with
its stakeholders in a manner that induces optimal contributions to the firm rather
than attempting to convey this information to external shareholders.
4. Possible Shareholder Interventions
In theory, we can imagine an extreme version of shareholder input on
stakeholder matters, with shareholders opining on very specific aspects of
stakeholder relationships, such as specific employment policies. The foregoing
discussion predicts that they would do so ineffectively. In practice, however, it
is very unlikely that shareholder input on these issues would take such specific
form. As described above, the trend of shareholder empowerment has been
driven by the increased prominence of institutional investors, the largest of
which own shares in thousands of companies around the world. It is implausible
that these large asset managers would involve themselves on such a granular
level with internal corporate policies. Doing so across their enormous portfolios
would be prohibitively costly.
A more plausible scenario envisions shareholders asking companies for
more generic indicators that they believe represent good stakeholder
management. Indeed, the Fink letter and similar communications from other

190. Mary Jo White, Chair, The Path Forward on Disclosure, SEC (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101513mjw#_ftn14 (“[T]he Commission adopted the first version of
Regulation S-K—an overarching single, uniform set of rules that form the core of the integrated disclosure
regime that we have today.”).
191. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 177, at 506 (“Complete disclosure is not cost-beneficial, period.”).
192. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1932.
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large institutional investors has sent precisely this message to public companies,
and companies have begun to respond.193 Lawyers from the prestigious
corporate law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP recently advised their
corporate clients as follows:
[W]e are starting to see evidence, through the annual letters, interviews and
other public-facing interactions, that investors have become more
sophisticated about what they expect from companies . . . . [T]he recent
letters and sentiments express nuanced and increasingly specific views about
investor expectations, and companies that wish to court favorable
impressions would be wise to understand the individual expectations.
....
[T]hat ideally results in taking investor concerns into consideration when
crafting disclosure, ESG reports, investor day presentations, analyst calls and
other forums for public interaction.194

Given that these messages from institutional investors appear to have had
real effects on the behavior of corporate managers, the most innocuous result of
this messaging would be that it does not meaningfully impact how corporate
managers manage their other stakeholder relationships. Perhaps corporate
managers believe that shareholders, despite their messaging, will not
meaningfully follow up on these public requests. In such a case, the costs to the
corporation would be only the costs of compliance with the shareholders’
requests. Though the quote above suggests this cost is not insignificant.
If, however, such requests by shareholders impact management activities
in any way, it will circumscribe the decisions left available to the manager,
reducing her agility in responding to changes in the firm or the product markets.
For example, if shareholders request or prefer certain results on customer
retention, a desire to please shareholders could lead managers to ignore new and
potentially profitable market segments if doing so meant losing existing
customers. Or, if management implements shareholder-approved employment
policies, those policies will not be specific to any one firm and are unlikely to
fit within the unique culture of any one company. The possible ways in which
this intervention could play out are infinite, but the common result is that if
managerial decisions about stakeholder relationships are driven by shareholder
expectations, managers will be left with less flexibility to incorporate their
superior information into these decisions.
So, direct shareholder involvement in stakeholder relationships is not likely
to occur. However, less specific shareholder interventions can still circumscribe

193. In an indication that corporate managers are responding to requests like those in the Fink letter, in
August 2019, the Business Roundtable—an organization comprised of the CEOs of leading corporations—
issued a statement by 181 CEOs committing to lead their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders. Business
Roundtable, supra note 6.
194. Pamela L. Marcogliese, et al., Synthesizing the Messages from BlackRock, State Street, and T. Rowe
Price, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/28/synthesizing-the-messages-from-blackrock-state-street-and-trowe-price/.
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managerial options in ways that could force the firm to ignore or undervalue
value-creating stakeholder information.

*****
Information asymmetries exist between public shareholders and the
corporations in which they invest that make shareholders unable to effectively
monitor managers’ attention to other stakeholders, and reporting to shareholders
cannot solve this asymmetry due to the nature of the information. The result is
that corporate managers will only be able to engage effectively with other
stakeholders if they are not unduly beholden to the preferences of shareholders.
Therefore, as Bratton and Wachter have argued, shareholder empowerment
should not be seen as a cure-all for perceived flaws in corporate activities,195 and
calling on shareholders to exert their substantial influence to monitor
stakeholder relationships will be ineffective.
If managerial fixation is caused by shareholder empowerment but
shareholders are ill equipped to overcome the resulting stakeholder neglect, the
solution would seem to lie in reducing shareholders’ relative influence over
corporate managers such that they are not in a position to opine on matters of
stakeholder relationships. The prospect of limiting shareholder power, however,
inevitably brings with it questions about how managers will use their newfound
freedom. The following Subpart considers that question.
C. TOO MANY MASTERS?
Perhaps the most frequent objection to a broad stakeholder view of the
corporation is that freeing corporate managers from strong shareholder oversight
leaves them essentially unmonitored. In the words of Professors Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, “a manager told to serve two masters (a little
for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is
answerable to neither.”196 The crux of this concern is that any time management
is not meeting the needs of one of its “masters,” it can always claim to be acting
in the interest of one of its other “masters,” even if it is actually only promoting
the self-interest of the managers themselves.
However, this objection is convincing only if the detrimental effects of less
shareholder oversight are greater than the detrimental effects of more
shareholder oversight. As has been discussed herein, disproportionate
shareholder power appears to have resulted in meaningful costs to corporations
and their shareholders.197 Thus, the question becomes which scenario results in
195. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 672–74.
196. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38
(1991).
197. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 177, at 506 (“[Shareholder proponents] pose an agency-cost win-win
situation—empower the shareholders and reduce the costs—with no acknowledgment that doing so might trigger
countervailing costs.”).
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greater net cost (or benefit)—weaker shareholders or stronger ones. While
attempting such a calculation is beyond the scope of this Article, some initial
observations call into question how great a cost results from reduced shareholder
influence.
Preliminarily, reducing the relative power of shareholders is not akin to
eliminating shareholder oversight. Instead, it means reducing the proportion of
managerial attention dedicated to meeting shareholder demands.198 Regardless
of the strength of shareholders’ voting power, corporate managers remain
subject to fiduciary duties under corporate law, and only shareholders can trigger
judicial intervention for a perceived violation of fiduciary duties.199 So, a
reduction in relative shareholder influence will not leave corporate managers
entirely free from shareholder oversight. Shareholders with relatively less power
will maintain their rights granted by state corporation law and thereby their
ability to, at a minimum, serve as a backstop against extreme managerial
misconduct.200
Additionally, a corporate manager subject to less than rigorous shareholder
scrutiny will not operate with complete disregard for the well-being of the
corporation. In terms of economic incentives, corporate executives care about
their reputational capital and can be expected to work to ensure the companies
they lead appear successful.201 More broadly, ample evidence demonstrates that
humans generally are not strictly “rational” economic utility-maximizing
beings.202 We can reasonably expect that most corporate managers care about
doing their job well and are sometimes willing to sacrifice some amount of their
own well-being to benefit other corporate constituencies.203 So, we can expect
that CEOs, in the absence of tight shareholder oversight, will care about the
success of the corporations they lead and therefore will take steps to optimize
the stakeholder inputs available to their corporations.
Moreover, what the team production theory elucidates is that nonshareholder stakeholders are not a general and ill-defined group under the
heading of “community.” Rather, they are specific groups whose inputs are
necessary to corporate production. In a well-functioning economy, there should
be competition for stakeholder inputs, and this market for inputs can create an

198. Both Bratton and Wachter, as well as Blair and Stout, point out that the scope of shareholder rights is
appropriately limited by existing corporate law. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 662 (“The prevailing legal
model of the corporation privileges the decisionmaking authority of the board of directors . . . . As a legal matter,
directors are not agents of the shareholders.”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 321–22.
199. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP.
LAW 637, 662 (2006).
200. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 283.
201. GREGG D. POLSKY & ANDREW C.W. LUND, CAN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM CURE SHORTTERMISM? 1, 6 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Issues-in-GS-58-Mar-2013polsky-lund.pdf.
202. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8 (2008).
203. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 8 (2011).
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accountability mechanism for management.204 Displeased employees, suppliers
or customers can decline to contribute to the corporation, to the detriment of
production and shareholder returns.205 Since even somewhat less powerful
shareholders will still have oversight ability, and since managers care about their
personal and firm reputations, the need to attract stakeholder inputs will ensure
some level of managerial attention to these groups.
Thus, reducing the relative power of shareholders could result in additional
rent seeking by managers, but this rent-seeking will usually be limited by the
managers’ desire to appear to be successfully managing their companies.
Moreover, it is far from clear how the cost of this rent-seeking behavior
compares to the costs of managerial fixation. Given this ambiguity, the default
to shareholder empowerment as a solution to all corporate imperfections seems
unwarranted. And, in particular, when the problem we are trying to solve derives
directly from disproportionate managerial attention to shareholders, as is the
case for managerial fixation, additional shareholder influence cannot be
expected to resolve the issue.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM: USING SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE TO REDUCE
SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE
Larry Fink’s letter was a response to widespread concerns about
managerial fixation, and the prior Part provided a theoretical explanation of both
how managerial fixation arises and how it may interfere with corporate value
maximization. As the above discussion has demonstrated, we cannot expect
shareholder oversight of stakeholder relationships to solve problems of
managerial fixation. However, the trends that have facilitated shareholder
empowerment cannot easily be reversed. The increased popularity of
institutional investors will not likely abate in the near future.206 Nor will the
prominent role of proxy advisors, in spite of extensive debate about their
usefulness.207 Scholars have called upon regulators to cease prioritizing
shareholder empowerment,208 but much of the shareholder empowerment trend
has been a consequence of private activity outside of regulatory control.209 And,
the prospect of shareholders voluntarily relinquishing the additional power they
have accumulated over the years seems unlikely.
Thus, rather than considering how to reverse shareholder empowerment,
this Article takes a more practical approach and offers two methods by which
today’s powerful institutional shareholders could use their substantial influence

204. Though, maintaining well-functioning markets is a first category interest that will require government
intervention. See discussion supra Subpart I.C.
205. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 177, at 492–93 (noting the constraints on managers posed by product
markets and organized groups such as labor and trade associations).
206. Absent large and unforeseen market changes.
207. GLASSMAN & PEIRCE, supra note 96, at 2.
208. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 727–28.
209. Rock, supra note 9, at 1910.
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to reduce managerial fixation and effectively redirect managerial attention to
other corporate stakeholders.
While shareholders will not be effective in any attempts to directly monitor
a corporation’s relationships with its many stakeholders, they can use their
influence to promote the adoption of governance mechanisms that will
encourage corporate managers to direct greater attention to other stakeholders.
The proposals described below would rebalance the incentives faced by
managers to encourage more and better stakeholder engagement. They would do
so by realigning incentives in two ways. First, they would create explicit internal
incentives for managers to engage with stakeholders, thereby capitalizing on
managers’ superior information about stakeholder relationships. At least as
importantly, however, they would also reduce the existing incentives that
managers have to focus narrowly on shareholder demands. If shareholders
themselves advocate for these mechanisms of stakeholder engagement, this
sends a credible signal to managers that engaging with stakeholders is what
shareholders desire. Thus, managers will be less fearful that by attending to the
needs of other stakeholders, they risk their jobs or reputations due to shareholder
dissatisfaction.210 Moreover, implementing accountability mechanisms for
stakeholder outcomes could reduce the likelihood that managers use their
additional flexibility to engage in rent seeking.
A. STAKEHOLDER IMPACT REPORTING TO THE BOARD
While public shareholders are not equipped to directly monitor a
corporation’s relationships with its other stakeholders, doing so is precisely the
role of the board of directors. The board is tasked with managing the
corporation,211 which necessarily means managing the corporation’s
relationships with its many stakeholders. Indeed, Blair and Stout posit that the
delegation of governance to a board of directors is a defining characteristic of a
public corporation.212 While, in practice, the CEO and other corporate
executives will usually be the managers who directly engage with stakeholders,
it is the board’s responsibility to oversee the activities of the executives. Thus,
to facilitate the board’s oversight, shareholders should press for reporting on
stakeholder outcomes to the board.
Professors Kose John, Jongsub Lee, and Ji Yeol Jimmy Oh conducted an
empirical study of the informational value of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) reporting by corporate managers to the board of directors.213 CSR
activities are largely activities directed at non-shareholder stakeholder groups.
Indeed, the study assessed firms’ CSR activities according to the categories:
210. POLSKY & LUND, supra note 201, at 6 (noting that the enhanced risk of termination by displeased
shareholders is of utmost concern to corporate CEOs).
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020).
212. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 251–52.
213. Kose John et al., The Information Value of Corporate Social Responsibility (Apr. 12, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119039.

746

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:699

community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment,
human rights, and products.214 These are all themes that directly affect nonshareholder stakeholder groups. They found that CSR reporting to the board
resulted in “more informed advising and monitoring by the board.”215 They
further found that the informational value of the CSR reporting was greatest in
corporations where information asymmetries between the CEO and the board
were the greatest.216 Based on these findings, they posit that CSR reporting
allows corporate boards to access firm-specific stakeholder information, thus
enhancing the board’s ability to play its supervisory role.217 This result is not
surprising given the foregoing analysis of how stakeholder relationships are
determinative of firm value.
Stakeholders’ firm-specific information is precisely the type of valuable
information that managers can glean from the negotiation of their incomplete
contracts with stakeholders, but to which shareholders have neither access nor
the capacity to monitor effectively. The board of directors, by contrast, sits
within the corporation, is by no means passive in its oversight of the company,218
and indeed is legally obligated to take an active role in overseeing the
corporation.219 Thus, by requiring that this information is shared with an
independent board of directors,220 shareholders can reduce managerial agency
costs by relying on the board’s superior monitoring position, rather than
attempting to engage in that monitoring themselves. Such a requirement would
demonstrate shareholders’ sincere interest in adequately managing to
stakeholders while putting in place a mechanism that is capable of enforcing that
commitment.
B. STAKEHOLDER-FOCUSED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION METRICS
When seeking to adjust corporate managers’ incentives, the most likely
place to turn is usually to executive compensation. Traditionally, this tool has
most often been used to align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders.221
However, as this Article has endeavored to demonstrate, managerial incentives
appear to have drifted too far in the direction of shareholder incentives.
Adjusting executive compensation to include metrics for non-shareholder
stakeholders could moderate managerial fixation.

214. Id. at 15.
215. Id. at 1.
216. Id. at 25.
217. Id.
218. As public company shareholders are. See supra Subpart II.B.3.
219. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
220. The independence of the board of directors is key to the findings of John, et al. Information asymmetries
will generally be greater where the board is independent. CSR reporting can overcome those asymmetries,
allowing the corporation to benefit from the independent perspective of outsider directors while avoiding some
of the associated costs. John et al., supra note 213, at 1–2.
221. Rock, supra note 9, at 1917.

April 2020]

MANAGERIAL FIXATION

747

A 2017 study by Professors Caroline Flammer, Bryan Hong, and Dylan
Minor found empirical support that stakeholder-focused compensation criteria
successfully “direct managers’ attention to stakeholders that are less salient but
financially material to the firm in the long run.”222 This study thus provides
compelling evidence that stakeholder compensation metrics can ameliorate
managerial fixation. It does not conclusively prove that such metrics will always
be successful. Indeed, as was discussed in Subpart III.B.3 above, developing
metrics for environmental and social impacts has long proved challenging.
Nonetheless, the prospect of internally developing stakeholder metrics that are
specific to a particular business provides an opportunity to avoid the challenges
that arise in attempts to create universally applicable metrics. Such internally
developed metrics would be developed by managers with an intimate
understanding of that particular corporation, and would be adjustable over time
as corporate insiders determine that circumstances have changed so as to warrant
a new or different stakeholder focus.
The idea of incorporating stakeholder criteria into executive compensation
formulas is not a new one. As of 2013, thirty-seven percent of S&P 500
companies had adopted some stakeholder criteria in their compensation
formulas.223 As of 2013, this practice was most common among emission-driven
industries and thus focused on emissions reduction and energy efficiency
goals.224 Nonetheless, related metrics could be developed for other corporate
stakeholders such as employee retention or customer loyalty, and scholars and
practitioners have already begun developing criteria for effective stakeholder
compensation metrics.225 Thus, shareholders can use their substantial influence
to press for executive compensation packages that include substantive criteria
for meeting stakeholder goals that are developed by and relevant to the
individual corporation.
These two proposals are necessarily preliminary, and there are surely other
possible approaches that could serve a similar function. The goal of this final
Part is to begin thinking about ways that, given the current balance of power in

222. Caroline Flammer et al., Corporate Governance and the Rise of Integrating Corporate Social
Responsibility Criteria in Executive Compensation: Effectiveness and Implications for Firm Outcomes 30 (Sept.
10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831694 (“[T]he adoption of CSR contracting
leads to i) an increase in long-term orientation, ii) an increase in firm value, iii) an increase in CSR . . . iv) a
reduction in emissions, and v) higher engagement in the development of ‘green’ innovations.”).
223. Id. at 3.
224. Id.
225. See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., INTEGRATING ESG ISSUES INTO EXECUTIVE PAY: A REVIEW
OF GLOBAL UTILITY AND EXTRACTIVE COMPANIES 6 (2016), https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=1798
(“Companies should consult with their shareholders in identifying ESG metrics and attempt to achieve a
thorough stakeholder mandate to enhance internal and external support.”); Graham Kenny, How Boards Can
Rein in CEO Pay, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/how-boards-can-rein-in-ceo-pay
(“[B]oard[s] should be looking at causal connections between what’s going on today and what’s expected
sometime hence: for instance, how employee results are driving customer results, and how those are propelling
shareholder results.”).
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publicly traded corporations, shareholders can meaningfully provide
opportunities to correct managerial fixation.
CONCLUSION
BlackRock’s public declaration of commitment to social impacts garnered
substantial attention because the current structure of the U.S. equity markets has
granted BlackRock extraordinary power. This shift of power has raised many
concerns about how shareholders influence public corporations’ social and
economic value. The solution to these concerns does not lie in exhorting
shareholders to exercise their substantial power to protect the interests of other
constituencies. Shareholders have inadequate information to do so effectively.
Rather, the solution lies in rebalancing managerial attention among corporate
stakeholders so that all stakeholders are incentivized to optimally contribute to
corporate production.

